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I NTRODUCTION
Two primary theories of employment discrimination have de-
veloped under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 The more
traditional theory is the disparate treatment theory, which prohibits
intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic.
The disparate treatment theory essentially prohibits members of
certain groups from being treated differently from other persons. 2
This theory reflects an "equal treatment" notion of equality, which
suggests that equality is achieved if persons of different groups are
treated in the same manner.'
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e - 15 (1988).
The United States Supreme Court described the disparate treatment theory in Teamsters
v. United States:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious
evil that Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted); see also C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R.
RIcHARos, I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2 (1988).
3 See Fits, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-38 (1971).
Professor Fist described the concept of equal treatment in the following manner:
Individual Negroes should be treated "equally" by employers in the sense that
their race should be "ignored," that is, not held against them. This sense of
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The less traditional and much more controversial theory of
employment discrimination under Title VII is the disparate impact
theory, which generally makes unlawful facially-neutral employer
practices that disproportionately disadvantage members of pro-
tected groups unless those effects can be justified. 4
 Proof of discrim-
inatory intent is generally not considered to be a requirement for
liability under the disparate impact theory." The disparate impact
theory is based on an "equal opportunity" notion of equality, which
suggests that mere equality of treatment is not sufficient to achieve
true equality because of the effects of past societal or employer
discrimination. This notion of equal opportunity holds that the
imposition of uniform standards or requirements on persons who
are unable to meet those requirements because of past discrimina-
tion or because of some other characteristic tied to their member-
ship in a protected group does not represent equality. 6
 The equal
opportunity concept of equality requires that the actual opportu-
nities provided to different groups be equal.
Although the disparate treatment theory has obtained general
acceptance, the disparate impact theory has had a checkered history
equality focuses on the starting positions in a race: If color is not a criterion for
employment, blacks will be on equal footing with whites.
Id. at 237.
The Supreme Court has defined the disparate impact theory as follows:
Claims of disparate treatment may he distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.I5 (citations omitted).
5 See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, Supra DOW 2, § 2.2.
6
 In The Zero Sum Society, Professor Thurow used Professor kiss's metaphor of a race to
demonstrate the problems with the equal treatment concept of equality:
Imagine a race with two groups of equal ability. Individuals differ in their
running ability, but the average speed of the two groups is identical. Imagine
that a handicapper gives each individual in one of the groups a heavy weight
to carry. Sonic of those with weights would still run faster than some of those
without weights, but on average, the handicapped group would fall farther and
farther behind the group without the handicap .... Now suppose that someone
waves a magic wand and all the weights vanish .... If the two groups are equal
in their running ability, the gap between those who never carried weights and
those who used to carry weights will cease to expand, but those who suffered
the earlier discrimination will never catch up .... If a fair race is one where
everyone has an equal chance to win, the race is not fair even though it is now
run with fair rules.
L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 188-89 (1980).
4	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:1
since its recognition and articulation in the 1971 United States
Supreme Court decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 7 In that case,
the Court took an expansive view of the theory, finding the footings
of the doctrine firmly rooted in congressional intent and in the
purposes for which Title VII was enacted' Since Griggs was decided,
however, the disparate impact theory has been the subject of a good
deal of commentary and dispute. Some commentators have praised
the doctrine as essential to the effectuation of the purposes of the
antidiscrimination laws; 9 others have argued that the theory is in-
consistent with the intent and purposes of Congress° and flawed
in practice, if not in theory)' Still others have struggled considerably
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8 Then Chief justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, explained the justification
of the disparate impact theory as follows:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discrim-
inatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
9 E.g., Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 Micx. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972) (stating that the Court's adoption
of the disparate impact theory in Griggs was "in the tradition of great cases . . which
announce and apply fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult
problems of human relationships" and makes possible "a prompt and effective nationwide
assault .. . on patterns of discrimination").
I° Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origins of the Adverse Impact
Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 brays. REL. L.J. 429,
516 (1985) (after an exhaustive review of the legislative history of Title VII, the author
concludes that Congress did not intend and in fact rejected the disparate impact theory). But
see Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972—A Response to Gold, 8
INDUS. REL. L.J. 105, 116 (1986) (regardless of intent of 1964 Congress in enacting Title
VII, Congress clearly approved of disparate impact model when it amended the statute in
1972); Blumrosen, Griggs Was Correctly Decided—A Response to Gold, 8 Expos. REL. L.J. 443,
447-50 (1986) (even if Congress did not expressly contemplate the disparate impact theory
in enacting the statute, that theory is consistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting
the statute).
" Much of the criticism of the application of the disparate impact theory has focused
on the allocation and definition of the burdens of proof placed on the respective parties. See
Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, 49 Lkw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 101-
02 & n.I7 (1986) (arguing that requirements for validation of selection criteria with a
disparate impact to satisfy "business necessity" defense are so onerous that it is practically
impossible to meet those requirements); Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test in
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. Rev. 345, 353-54 (1980) (widespread
use of the disparate impact theory will result in employment of a marginally less productive
workforce and will cause employers to abandon criteria that would satisfy the requirements
of Griggs).
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to articulate a justification for the doctrine that is consistent with
both the language of Title VII and the intent of Congress in en-
acting that statute.' 2
This scrutiny of the doctrinal foundations of the disparate
impact theory has not been confined to the pages of law reviews.
Ever since Griggs was decided, the courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, have seemed to struggle with the purpose
and therefore with the application of the theory.' 3 The struggle of
the Supreme Court with the underpinnings of the disparate impact
theory has intensified in recent terms, particularly in the cases of
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,' 4 decided in 1988, and Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 15 decided in 1989. In those cases, the
Court made changes to the burden of production and burden of
persuasion previously thought applicable to the disparate impact
theory.
The disparate impact theory has also recently captured the
attention of Congress. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, introduced in
12 Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Tide VII Litigation,
46 U. MT. L. REV. 555, 579-86 (1985) (arguing that the foundation for the theory of
disparate impact is the theory of "productive efficiency," which recognizes that employer
actions with a disparate impact have the effect of depriving the economy of the efficient use
of manpower); Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Tide VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimi-
nation, 73 VA. L, REV. 1297, 1299-1311 (1987) (although concluding that there is no direct
textual support for the disparate impact model in Title VII, Rutherglen argues that the
existence of the model is justified as a method for challenging pretextual discrimination that
would otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, to prove); Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model
of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 799, 804-22 (1985). Willborn argues
that the disparate impact theory exists in. a theoretical vacuum. After addressing a range of
possible theories for the model—intent theory, past discrimination theory, functional equiv-
alence theory, and statistical discrimination theory—Willborn concludes that the disparate
impact model is based on the statistical discrimination theory, which assumes that employers
take certain actions because they lack sufficient information to make low cost decisions about
the productivity of particular employees and therefore rely on prohibited proxies. Walborn,
supra, at 804-22.
15 Only a few years after the Court in Griggs indicated that intent was irrelevant to
disparate impact analysis, the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody seemed to read intent
back into the analysis by relying on the concept of "pretextual discrimination." 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975). The Court indicated that after the employer has met its burden of showing that
a selection criteria with a disparate impact on protected groups is "job related," the plaintiff
has the opportunity to demonstrate that other selection criteria would meet the goals of the
employer without the undesirable effects on protected groups. Id. The Court said that this
showing "would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for
discrimination." Id. The Court's use of the term "pretext" seems to suggest an element of
intent as part of the plaintiff's rebuttal burden. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying
text for a more complete discussion of the Albemarle case.
14 487 U.S. 977.( 1988).
15 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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part in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove,' 6
would overrule the Court's reallocations of the burdens of proof
for the disparate impact theory. Although the current dispute be-
tween the Court and Congress concerning the disparate impact
theory has focused on the definition and the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof applicable to cases brought under that theory, the
issue is much more fundamental than simply determining how
difficult it will be for the respective parties to prove their cases.
The Court's reallocation of the burdens of proof seems to
reflect the Court's changing perception of the foundation and pur-
pose of the disparate impact theory. These changes suggest that the
Court is moving away from the equal opportunity notion of equality
that has traditionally been the basis of the disparate impact theory
and instead is embracing the equal treatment notion of equality as
the exclusive concept of equality under Title VII. The Court's
changes to the burdens of proof may indeed foretell the ultimate
demise of the disparate impact theory as an independent and suf-
ficient basis for liability under Title VII.' 7
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, which passed both the House
and the Senate before being vetoed by President Bush," if ulti-
i6 S. 2104, 136 CONG. REC. 51020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990); H.R. 4000, 136 CONC. REC.
H364 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1990 deals with many more issues
than just the allocation of the burdens of proof for disparate impact claims. See infra note
296. The other issues raised by that legislation are beyond the scope of this article.
This is not the first, and may not be the last, article speculating on the demise of the
disparate impact theory. Professor Furnish suggested that then recent cases indicated that •
the Court was moving towards a merger of the disparate impact theory into the disparate
treatment theory of employment discrimination. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and
Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419, 490-45 (1982). Professor Cox also suggests that a merger of
the different theories is likely, but indicates that it would be the disparate treatment theory,
rather than the disparate impact theory, that would be the loser in the merger. Cox, The
Future of the Disparate Impact Theory of Employment Discrimination After Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 753, 797-98 (1988). Finally, other authors, although apparently
troubled by some of the challenges to the disparate impact theory, seem to conclude that the
theory of disparate impact is alive and well. Helfand and Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality
of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939, 963-68 (1985). Perhaps we can
hope, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that reports of the death of the disparate impact theory
have been "greatly exaggerated." RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 76 (S. Platt 1989). Although some
of these articles have argued that the two theories are being merged into one theory, none
of the articles has focused, as does this article, on the allocation of the burdens of proof in
the respective theories as central to the continued validity of the two separate theories.
18 S. 2104, 136 CONG. REC. S9966 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (bill passed by vote of 65 to
34); H.R. 4000, 136 CONG. REC. H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (bill passed by vote of 272
to 154); 136 CONG. REC. S 15,407 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (conference report adopted by
Senate by vote of 62 to 34); 136 CONG. REC. 119994-96 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (conference
report adopted by House by vote of 273 to 154).
December 1990]	 DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY	 7
mately allowed to become law, has the potential to resurrect the
disparate impact theory as a viable theory of employment discrim-
ination. Whether that legislation has this effect depends on Con-
gress's recognition of the significance of the Court's reallocation of
the burdens of proof and the clarity of Congress's articulation of
the purpose of the disparate impact theory.
This article will focus on the meaning of the Court's reallocation
of the burdens of proof for disparate impact cases under Title VII
and the effects of Congress's re-reallocation of those burdens. Al-
though commentators have viewed the actions of Congress regard-
ing this reallocation as purely a political measure aimed at more
stringent enforcement of the civil rights laws, I will argue that,
analytically, it is Congress, and not the Supreme Court, that has
correctly chosen the allocation of burdens that is consistent with the
purposes of the disparate impact theory.
In Part I of this article, I will explore the origins of the disparate
impact theory by looking at the language and legislative history of
Title VII and at the early administrative and judicial applications
of that theory." I will conclude that, although both the language
and the legislative history of Title VII are ambiguous on the ques-
tion of whether Congress intended the disparate impact theory to
be part of Title VII, the disparate impact theory is consistent with
the general purposes of Congress in enacting the statute and is
necessary for the achievement of the aims of the antidiscrimination
laws. This study of the origins of the disparate impact theory is
important to determine the correctness of the decisions now being
made by the Court and Congress concerning the future of the
disparate impact theory.
In Part II of the article, I will describe the different purposes
of the disparate impact theory suggested by the cases applying that
theory. 2° Certain of those cases are consistent with the "pure" form
of the disparate impact theory, in which the theory is used as a
method to attack the effects of employer practices without regard
to the intent behind those practices; other cases suggest that the
disparate impact theory is being used merely as a method for at-
tacking pretextual intentional discrimination.
In Part III of the article, I will examine the role of burdens of
production and burdens of persuasion in meeting the purposes of
See infra notes 23-147 and accompanying text.
14
 See infra notes 148-177 and accompanying text.
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the disparate impact theory.2 ' I will compare the allocations of those
burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases and disparate impact
cases and explore the relationship between the allocation of those
burdens and the purposes of the respective theories. I will then
address the use of these burdens of proof by the Supreme Court
in Watson and Wards Cove and examine the implication of such use
for the Court's current view of the purposes of the disparate impact
theory. 1 will argue that the Court's allocation of the burdens of
proof reflects the Court's choice between the different possible
purposes of the disparate impact theory by sanctioning the "pretext"
model of that theory; that is, the view of the disparate impact theory
as a method of challenging pretextual intentional discrimination.
Finally, in Part IV of the article, I will demonstrate the con-
tinuing need for the disparate impact theory in its pure form, as
initially expressed by the Supreme Court in Griggs.22 I will suggest
that the Court has taken a definitive step towards merging the
disparate impact theory into the disparate treatment theory. I will
also examine whether the Civil Rights Act of 1990 can preserve the
disparate impact theory as a viable method of establishing violations
of Title VII.
I. ORIGINS OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. The Statutory Basis for the Disparate Impact Theory
The concept of discrimination that is the basis of the disparate
impact theory is quite different from the concept of discrimination
that underlies the disparate treatment theory. Based on an equal
opportunity concept of equality, the "pure" form of the disparate
impact theory, in which employers will be held liable solely because
of the effects of their employment practices, will find discrimination
in circumstances in which employers do not intend to disadvantage
minority group members and in fact treat minority group members
precisely the same as they treat others. In some ways, finding dis-
crimination in such actions is somewhat counterintuitive to the com-
mon understanding of the term "discrimination," which normally
includes some notion of differences in treatment."
2 ' See infra notes 178-273 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 274-305 and accompanying text.
23 The term "discrimination" is defined as "the according of differential treatment to
persons of an alien race or religion"; a synonym is "differentiation." "Discriminate" is defined
as "to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of
individual merit." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648 (unabr. ed. 1986).
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Determining whether the disparate impact theory was intended
to be part of Title VII is made more difficult because the term
"discrimination" is not defined in the statute. Section 703(a) of Tide
VII, however, sets forth the employer actions that are prohibited
by the statute:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin."
The meaning of the prohibition set forth in section 703(a)(1)
seems straightforward: employers are prohibited from taking ad-
verse employment actions against individuals "because of" certain
protected characteristics. Although there is no express requirement
of intent to discriminate set forth in section 703(a)(1), the require-
ment of an intent to discriminate seems implicit in the language
used, particularly the phrase "because of." The most natural read-
ing of this phrase and the subsection as a whole is that employers
are prohibited from taking adverse employment action against in-
dividuals when such actions are motivated by the race, sex, religion,
or national origin of those individuals. Under this reading of the
statute, section 703 (a)(1) forms the statutory basis of the disparate
treatment theory.
If this is the proper interpretation to be given section 703(a)(1),
there is some question as to the purpose served by section 703(a)(2).
One answer is that section 703(a)(1) provides the statutory basis for
the disparate treatment theory; section 703(a)(2) provides the sta-
tutory basis for the disparate impact theory. This explanation has
obtained a good deal of popular acceptance. Section 703(a)(2) of
Title VII is most often cited as the statutory basis for the disparate
impact theory. 25
21
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
28 The United States Supreme Court in Griggs cited § 703(a)(2) without elaboration in
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The presence of the words "adversely affect" in section
703(a)(2) makes reliance on this section as the statutory basis for
the disparate impact theory almost irresistible. After all, the premise
of the disparate impact model is that certain facially neutral em-
ployment practices, including tests and other selection criteria, op-
erate to "classify" employees and job applicants in certain ways that
"deprive" them of "employment opportunities" and "adversely af-
fect" their status as employees "because of" their race or other
protected classification. 26
 The language of section 703(a)(2), at least
on its face, is consistent with the disparate impact theory.
It has been suggested, however, that section 703(a)(2) was also
intended to incorporate the requirement of an intent to discriminate
that courts have found in section 703(a)(1). The textual support for
this position reads the words "because of" in both subsections to
mean "motivated by"; that is, the type of causation contemplated
by Congress was motivational causation. 27
 Under this interpretation
of the statute, adverse employer actions are unlawful under Title
VII only when those actions were motivated by unlawful discrimi-
natory intent or motive on the part of the employer.
This interpretation does not, however, seem compelled by the
statutory language. Although the phrase "because of" in section
addressing the issue of whether the effects of the employer's practices violated Title VII.
401 U.S. 424, 426 rt.1 (1971). The Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert suggested that
challenges to the effects of employer practices were to be brought under § 703(a)(2) and
challenges to the intent behind such practices were appropriately brought under § 703(a)(1).
429 U.S. 125, 137 & n.13 (1976). In Connecticut u. Teal, the Court clearly indicated that
§ 703(a)(2) was the source of the disparate impact model. 457 U.S. 440, 445-49 (1982).
26
 The Supreme Court said precisely this in Teal :
A disparate-impact claim reflects the language of § 703(a)(2) and Congress' basic
objectives in enacting that statute: "to achieve equality of employment opportu-
nities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees." When an employer uses a
non-job-related barrier in order to deny a minority or woman applicant em-
ployment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant adverse effect on
minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of an employment
opportunity "because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." In other
words, § 703(a)(2) prohibits "discriminatory . . . barriers to employment" that
"limit ... or classify ... applicants for employment . in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities."
457 U.S. at 448 (footnote and citations omitted).
27
 This appears to be the position taken by Professor Gold in support of his argument
that Congress did not contemplate the disparate impact theory when it enacted Title VII.
Gold, supra note 10, at 511-13. Professor Rutherglen also concludes, based on his reading
of the structure of 703(a)(2), that only intentional discrimination is prohibited by the
statutory language. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1299-1302. lie also apparently reads the
term "because of" to mean "motivated by."
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703(a)(2) could be read to incorporate a requirement of motiva-
tional causation, there are other meanings that can be given to those
words. The ordinary dictionary definitions of "because" and "cause"
include types of causation other than motivational causation: those
terms include both "a reason or motive for an action or condition"
and "a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about an ef-
fect."28 This second definition indicates that a result can be "caused"
by the race or other protected characteristic of an individual even
if the result is not motivated by that characteristic.
Nor is it clear that the phrase "because of" has to have precisely
the same meaning in both subsections of section 703(a). Although
both uses of the phrase "because of" necessarily impose some re-
quirement of causation, different uses of that phrase might impose
different standards of causation. Without doing any violence to the
statutory language, it is possible, therefore, to interpret section
703(a)(1) to require motivational causation, that is, that the em-
ployer take the prohibited action based on discriminatory motive,
while interpreting section 703(a)(2) to be satisfied if race or some
other protected classification is a factor that produces the loss of
employment opportunities or other adverse effect. 29
Even if this reading of the statute is somewhat strained, this
interpretation is consistent with general rules of statutory construc-
tion. One canon of statutory construction is that legislation not be
construed in such a way as to render portions of it superfluous."
If section 703(a)(2) is read to prohibit only intentionally discrimi-
natory employer action, it would simply prohibit the same acts
already prohibited by section 703(a)(1) and would serve no purpose.
On the other hand, construing section 703(a)(1) to prohibit em-
ployer action because of the intent behind such practices while
construing section 703(a)(2) to prohibit employer action because of
the effects of those practices has the virtue of giving substantive
meaning to both subsections of section 703(a).
The language of Title VII is not inconsistent with the disparate
impact theory and, in fact, provides some textual support for the
" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 356 (unabr. ed. 1986).
29 See Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: The Disparate Impact
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 305, 324-25 (1983).
m See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); In re Bellanca Aircraft
Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1988);. Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372, 379-80 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 2A SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).
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existence of that theory. Neither, however, is the statutory language
a ringing endorsement of the disparate impact theory. The ambi-
guity in the language of Title VII as to whether Congress intended
the disparate impact theory to apply to claims under the statute
counsels resort to the legislative history of the statute. The legislative
history itself, however, is not unambiguous.31
Resort to legislative history to explain the meaning of unclear statutory provisions is
always somewhat troublesome, because legislative history often contains much to support
either side of an interpretational dispute. This problem is made worse by certain quirks in
the legislative history of Title VII. For example, the part of the bill that became Title VII
was added to the original bill as the result of executive sessions of a subcommittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, which recommended the amended bill to the full Com-
mittee, which in turn adopted an amendment in the nature of the substitute. Vaas, Tide VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. Nous. & Cont. L. REV. 431, 435 (1966). Some members of the
Committee took exception to the manner in which the substitute bill was prepared and
presented to the Committee:
This legislation is being reported to the House without the benefit of any
consideration, debate, or study of the bill by any subcommittee or committee
of the House and without any member of any committee or subcommittee being
granted an opportunity to offer amendments to the bill . . . . It was drawn in
secret meetings held between certain members of this committee, the Attorney
General and members of his staff and certain select persons, to the exclusion
of other committee members.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 62-63 (Minority Report Upon Proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary Substitute For H.R. 7152), reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. News 2431, 2431; see also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. I, at 62 (additional views of Hon. Arch A. Moore, Jr.), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Cool
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2430, 2430 ("[Al 'compromise' bill was sprung upon the committee
from out of the night. Where it came from or who were its benefactors remains to this day
a deep, dark secret. The bill reported was conceived in segregation, born in intolerance, and
nurtured in discrimination.").
An additional fact complicating the legislative history of Title VII is that the bill as
passed by the House was not referred to committee, although both proponents and opponents
of the bill moved to do so. Vaas, supra at 443-44. Finally, an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, was prepared outside of the floor of the Senate
by a bipartisan group with the purpose of reaching agreement on amendments to the bill to
ensure its passage. Id. at 445-46.
One commentator has said the following about Title VII and its legislative history:
The emergent Title VII is an obtuse hodgepodge of legislative compromise.
The statutory provisions are complex, confusing, contradictory, and incomplete.
The legislative history is virtually useless. As Judge Goldberg has stated [in
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970)], "The
legislative history of Title VII is in such a confused state that it is of minimal
value in its explication."
Modjeska, The Supreme Court and the Ideal of Equal Employment Opportunity, 36 MERCER L. REV.
795, 798 (1985).
In spite of the troubling aspects of legislative history in general and Title VI l's legislative
history in particular, a search of Title VII's legislative history does provide clues as to the
purpose of Congress in enacting the statute.
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B. The Legislative History of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
I. The Meaning of "Discrimination"
Relatively little direct support for the disparate impact theory
of employment discrimination exists in the legislative history of Title
VII. The primary focus of Congress at the time the statute was
enacted appears to have been formal policies of segregation and
individual acts of discrimination based on racial animus. 32 This type
of discrimination—involving an intent to treat persons of a partic-
ular race differently from persons of another race—is the essence
of the intentional discrimination that comprises the disparate treat-
ment theory of employment discrimination.
It is less clear that Congress focused on whether employer
action that was not discriminatorily motivated, but which adversely
affected members of racial minorities, would violate the new law.
Portions of the legislative history support the argument made by a
number of commentators" that only intentional discrimination was
contemplated by Congress in enacting the statute. In explaining one
of the charges made to the proposed statute, Senator Humphrey,
one of the Senate leaders involved in a substitute compromise bill
aimed at ensuring the passage of Title VII, described the reach of
Title VII:
Section 706(g) is amended to require a showing of
intentional violation of the title in order to obtain relief.
This is a clarifying change. Since the title bars only dis-
crimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin it would seem already to require intent, and,
thus, the proposed change does not involve any substan-
tive change in the title. The express requirement of intent
is designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or
accidental discrimination will not violate the title or result
in entry of court orders. It means simply that the respon-
dent must have intended to discriminate. 34
32 The legislative history of Title VII is filled with expressions of concern about the
intentionally discriminatory practices of employers against blacks and other minorities. See,
e.g., 110 CONG, REC. 6547 (Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC.
13088 (,tune 9, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC. 13089 ( June 9, 1964)
(statement of Sett. Morse).
33 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 10, at 516; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1299.
34 110  CONG. REC. 12724 ( June 4, 1964).
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The presence of the word "intentional" in section 706(g) has
not proved fatal to the disparate impact theory because the courts
have construed that term to mean "not accidental," finding the
requirement to be met as long as the employer meant to take the
action claimed to be discriminatory. 35 This is certainly a permissible
interpretation to give to the term "intentional," 36 and this interpre-
tation has some support in Senator Humphrey's reference to "in-
advertent or accidental discrimination." On the other hand, Senator
Humphrey's statement that the statute already requires "intenti! and
that the insertion of the word "intentional" means that "the respon-
dent must have intended to discriminate" suggests that the term
"intentional" might have been intended to convey more than just
" not accidental," but rather some discriminatory motive on the part
of the employer.
There is, in fact, some evidence that Congress may have con-
sidered and rejected the disparate impact theory as a type of dis-
crimination actionable under the statute. The Interpretative Mem-
orandum on Title VII introduced into the Congressional Record
by Senators Case and Clark, the bipartisan co-captains responsible
for Title VII, gave the following interpretation of the meaning of
discrimination under the statute:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination
is vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden
meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor, and those dis-
tinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are
prohibited by section 703 are those which are based on
any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification
for employment is not affected by this title.
" See, e.g., Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.
1972); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Although the
United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the meaning of the term "inten-
tionally" in § 706(g), its willingness to allow relief in disparate impact cases indicates that it
gives a similar interpretation to that word.
' 6 One of the dictionary definitions of the term "intentional" is "done deliberately or on
purpose;" the antonym given is "accidental." THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 693
(1975). On the other hand, the legal definition given to the term "intentional" usually
connotes more purposeful action: "determination to act in a certain way or to do a certain
thing;" "meaning, will, purpose, design." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 948 (4th ed. 1968).
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There is no requirement in title VII that employers
abandon bona fide qualification tests where, because of
differences in background and education, members of
some groups are able to perform better on these tests than
members of other groups. An employer may set his qual-
ifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine
which applicants have these qualifications, and he may
hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test perfor-
mance."
The concept of differential treatment contained in the first para-
graph quoted above seems to refer to the type of discrimination
that is the essence of the disparate treatment theory. The concept
described in the second paragraph—that employer qualifications
might adversely affect employees of certain racial groups—describes
the disparate impact theory. Senators Case and Clark appear to be
saying that only the first type of discrimination, which we know as
disparate treatment, is included within the meaning of the term
"discrimination."
2. Congressional Concern About Employment Tests
The legislative history regarding the use of employment tests •
is perhaps most relevant to the issue of whether the disparate impact
theory was meant to be included as a basis for liability under Title
VII. In spite of the apparent approval of the use of employment
" 110 CoNo, Rix. 7212, 7213 (Apr. 8, 1964). The United States Supreme Court. has
recognized the authoritativeness of this Interpretative Memorandum. Firefighters v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 581 11.14 (1984); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787
11.8 (1989). The Supreme Court addressed this piece of legislative history in Griggs v. Duke
Power Cu., concluding that the term "qualifications" could be read to mean criteria ensuring
that "applicants be lit for the job," that is, job-related criteria. 401 U.S. 424, 435 n.11 (1971).
Giving that language this meaning suggests that only job-related criteria with an adverse
impact are protected by Title VII and that criteria that are not so related are actionable.
This interpretation transforms the legislative history from a rejection of the disparate impact
model into an endorsement of that theory. It is somewhat troubling for so much to depend
on the interpretation to be given to an ambiguous term.
.	 On the other hand, there is some support elsewhere in the Case-Clark Interpretative
Memorandum that they may indeed have given the term 'qualifications" this meaning. In a
section of the memorandum dealing with the bona fide occupational qualification defense,
the senators noted the following: "This exception must not be confused with the right which
all employers would have to hire and tire on the basis of general qualifications for the job,
such as skill or intelligence." 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (Apr. 8, 1964). In this passage, the
senators do appear to be using the term "qualifications" to mean criteria required for the
job.
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tests and other selection criteria in the Case-Clark Interpretative
Memorandum quoted above, a number of congressional members
continued to express concern that Title VII would prevent employ-
ers from judging employees on the merits. Congressional debate on
this issue centered around a then-recent decision by a hearing ex-
aminer for the Illinois Fair Employment Commission in Myart v.
Motorola Co."
The Motorola case arose out of a claim made by a black job
applicant, Leon Myart, that he had been denied employment with
Motorola because of his race. Motorola claimed that one reason for
the denial of employment was Myart's failure to obtain a satisfactory
score on a written test required as a condition of employment. 39
The test required of the applicant was described by the test's author
as "the shortest test of intelligence that has been developed," mea-
suring verbal understanding and understanding of instructions."
The hearing examiner found the test to be discriminatory because
it did "not lend itself to equal opportunity to qualify for hitherto
culturally deprived and the disadvantaged groups": use of the test
placed members of minority groups at a "competitive disadvantage."
The hearing examiner went on to note that, to effectuate the goals
of the state antidiscrimination laws, employers needed to "eradicate
unfair employment practices" . . . [by] "adapting procedures" to fit
the needs of previously deprived classes of employees and that
"[s]election techniques may have to be modified at the outset in the
light of experience, education, or attitudes of the group."'"
39
 Charge No. 63C-127, Decision and Order of Hearing Examiner (III. Fair Emp. Prac.
Comm. Feb. 26, 1964), reprinted at 110 CONG. REC. 5662 (Mar. 19, 1964).
39 Id. at 5663. Motorola also alleged that the plaintiff had not been hired because he
had failed to inform the company through his job application and interview of relevant
educational and job experience and because of his arrest record, apparently for sodomy. Id.
at 5663-64; see also 110 CONG. REC. 9025 (Apr. 24, 1964). The hearing examiner discounted
these other grounds for the employment decision made by Motorola, making a credibility
determination that those factors were nut determinative in the decision in any event. 110
CONG. REC. at 5663, 5664 (Mar. 19, 1964). .
40
 110 CONG. REC. 5663 (Mar. 19, 1964). The questions in test No. 10 are reprinted at
110 CONG. REC. 9033 (Apr. 24, 1964).
4 ' 110 CONG. REC. 5664 (Mar. 19, 1964). Rather ironically, in light of the backlash in
Congress concerning the Motorola decision, the examiner's comments about the intelligence
test given to Myart were not even necessary to the resolution of the claim. The examiner did
not find that the company excluded Myart because of an unsatisfactory score on a discrimi-
natory test; he found that Myart had actually passed the test because Motorola had failed to
introduce any evidence concerning Myart's score on the test. The examiner indicated that if
the respondent had produced the test administrator to testify, "the showing would have been
adverse to the respondent." Id. at 5663-64.
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The type of discrimination that the hearing examiner described
is the essence of the disparate impact theory of discrimination. He
did not find that the employer had any discriminatory intent in
requiring the test as a condition of employment; he found the test
to be objectionable because of its effect on disadvantaged groups as
compared to its effect on advantaged groups. He indicated that
employers have a responsibility not to employ certain tests that have
such an effect. He did not even address whether the test actually
measured the requirements of the job. His opinion can therefore
be read to invalidate all tests with an adverse impact on minorities. 42
Congressional reaction to the Motorola case was uniformly neg-
ative.'" Senator Tower relied on the Motorola case to justify an
amendment to Title VII dealing with the issue of professionally
developed ability tests. In introducing his initial amendment on the
subject of professionally developed ability tests, he indicated that
the hearing examiner in the Motorola case invalidated a test because
it was found to be discriminatory as to culturally deprived groups
and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission might
attempt to regulate tests in a similar fashion. Senator Tower went
on to defend the test at issue in the Motorola case:
Since the case arose, it has been repeatedly stated by
psychologists and testing experts that the test was not
designed to "select-out" any cultural group. It is obvious
that tests can and are being written which are both fair
42 An explanation of the hearing examiner's decision appeared in a newspaper article
printed in the Wall Street Journal on April 21, 1964: "Mr. Bryant contends, 'There's abso-
lutely nothing in my ruling which would preclude an employer from testing applicants in a
way pertinent to the job they're seeking. Use of intelligence tests of this sort is a tool serving
to discriminate between whites and Negroes, whether done deliberately or not.'" Id. These
remarks indicate that the examiner condemned the test because it was not "pertinent to the
job," that is, it was not job-related.
" Even the proponents of Title Vii went to great Lengths to indicate their disapproval
of' the hearing examiner's decision. Senator Case, in response to Senator 'l'ower's first pro-
posed amendment on professionally developed ability tests, stated: "1 feel certain that no
member of the Senate disagrees with the views of the Senator from Texas concerning the
Motorola case finding by the referee or examiner." 110 CONG. Rite. 13503 (,June II, 1964).
Senator Case went on to explain his position on the amendment:
want it to be clearly understood, so far as I am concerned—and 1 believe
that I speak for all members of the committee, the captains, and the leadership—
that our position against this amendment ... doles] not mean approval of the
Motorola case or that the bill embodies anything like the action taken by the
examiner in that case.
110 CONG. REc. 13504 ( June 11, 1964).
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and extremely useful. There is no professional evidence
to the contrary."
Senator Tower indicated that his proposed amendment would
allow an employer to give any professionally developed ability test
to an employee or job applicant and act on the test results, as long
as the employer gave the test to all concerned individuals without
regard to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Senator Tower
added that this would ensure that "everybody will get the same fair
test; everybody will get the same fair chance.""
Senator Tower's initial amendment would have allowed em-
ployers to give and rely on the results of any professionally devel-
oped ability test as long as the "test is designed to determine or
predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable" for the
"particular business or enterprise involved" and if the test were
given to all persons being considered for the position."
Senator Case raised two objections to Senator Tower's initial
amendment. The first objection appears to have been that the
amendment would protect professionally developed ability tests
even if they were used for the purpose of discriminating:
If this amendment were enacted, it could be an ab-
solute bar and would give an absolute right to an employer
to state as a fact that he had given a test to all applicants,
whether it was a good test or not, so long as it was profes-
sionally developed. Discrimination could actually exist un-
der the guise of compliance with the statute. 47
It is possible to read Senator Case's remarks concerning "good tests"
to mean tests that accurately predict job performance, that is, job-
related tests. If his words are given that meaning, his objection to
the proposed amendment could be that it would have protected
non-job-related tests."
Senator Case's second objection to the first proposed Tower
amendment was that the amendment was unnecessary.' The Sen-
ator's view that the amendment was unnecessary is explained by an
44 110 CoNG. REC. 11251 (May 19, 1969).
45 Id.
46 Amendment No. 605, 110 Core. REC. 11251 (May 19, 1964).
47 110 Cotqc. REC. 13504 (June 11, 1964).
4" This appears to he the manner in which the Supreme Court in Griggs interpreted the
comments of Senator Case. See 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971).
49 110 CONG. REC. 13503 (June 11, 1964).
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earlier memorandum prepared by Senator Case indicating why the
Motorola case could not occur under Title VII:
Whatever merit as a socially desirable objective, title
VII would not require, and no court could read title VII
as requiring, an employer to lower or change the occu-
pational qualifications he sets for his employees simply
because proportionally fewer Negroes than whites are able
to meet them ... .
Title VII says merely that a covered employer cannot
refuse to hire someone simply because of his color, that
is, because he is a Negro. But it expressly protects the
employer's right to insist that any prospective applicant,
Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifica-
tions. Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is to promote
hiring on 
of
 basis of job qualifications, rather than on
the basis  race or color. Title VII would in no way
interfere with the right of an employer to fix job qualifi-
cations and any citation of the Motorola case to the con-
trary as precedent for title VII is wholly wrong and mis-
leading. 5°
What Senator Case seems to have been saying is that an employer
could not be held to have violated Title VII just because of the
adverse effects of its job criteria: the Motorola case could not occur
under Title VII because there is no cause of action based on such
adverse effects.
There is, however, another interpretation that one can give to
the remarks of Senator Case. The Supreme Court in Griggs relied
on Senator Case's reference to "applicable job qualifications" to
mean qualifications required by the job, rather than criteria set by
the employer, thereby concluding that Senator Case was suggesting
that only job-related tests or other selection criteria were protected
by Title VII. 51 Under this interpretation, employer use of non-job-
'') 110 CONG. REC. 6416 (Mar. 24, 1964).
51 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434-36. There are other indications in the legislative history that
members of Congress objected to the Motorola case because of its potential effect an job-
related tests. Senator 'rower indicated that the Motorola decision "put a premium on igno-
rance":
It said, in effect, that a test is discriminatory if it discriminates against those
who are by virtue of intellectual and educational background incompetent to
do a particular job . . . . It is certainly right and proper for a private company
to require that a man possess certain skills necessary to perfOrm the work
required by that company, or that he possess a sufficient intellect to be trainable
to do a specific job.
110 CONG. Ric, 9025 (Apr. 24, 1964).
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related tests with an adverse impact would still be actionable under
the statute.
Senator Humphrey also argued against the first Tower amend-
ment on the ground that it was unnecessary, using language even
more damaging to the disparate impact theory:
Every concern of which this amendment seeks to take
cognizance has already been taken care of in title VII, as
amended, and presented in the substitute. These tests are
legal. They do not need to be legalized a second time.
They are legal unless used for the purpose of discrimi-
nation. The amendment is unnecessary. It would only
complicate the package amendment, which has been care-
fully drawn and represents the considered views on the
part of those concerned about title V11. 52
Senator Humphrey's position is not subject to the ambiguity
present in the comments of Senator Case. His position is that tests
and other selection criteria are legal unless used with a discrimi-
natory intent: tests are not made unlawful solely because of their
effects.
This congressional debate over the first Tower amendment
resulted in its defeat." Two days later, Senator Tower submitted a
second amendment on the subject of professionally developed abil-
ity tests, which had been cleared through the "Attorney General,
the leadership, and the proponents of the bill." 54
 That amendment,
which was ultimately incorporated into Title VII as section 703(h),
provided:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to give and to act upon the results of any profes-
sionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
Virtually no debate occurred over this second amendment.
Senator Humphrey noted that "[s]enators on both sides of the aisle
who were deeply interested in title VII have examined the text of
this amendment and have found it to be in accord with the intent
52
 110 CONC. REC. 13504 ( June 11, 1964).
5' 110 CONC. REC. 13505 ( June 11, 1964).
51
 Amendment No. 952, 110 CONC. REC. 13724 ( June 13, 1964).
55 Id. Section 703(h) of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
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and purpose of that title." 5'' Because of this lack of explanation, the
meaning of section 703(h) must be gleaned from its language. The
terms "designed" and "intended . to discriminate" indicate that
the use of such tests would only be unlawful if the employer had
engaged in intentional discrimination with respect to those tests.
The term "used" is more ambiguous. The term could be interpreted
to incorporate a requirement of intent; that is, the term could be
read to mean "purposefully used" to discriminate. There is, how-
ever, no express requirement that the use of the test to discriminate
be purposeful. Therefore, it is possible to read the requirement
that the challenged test be "used" to discriminate to include situa-
tions in which the use of the test has a discriminatory effect, even
if that effect was not intended.
The Supreme Court in Griggs apparently relied on the term
"used" in section 703(h) as statutory support for its holding that
tests imposed or administered without any discriminatory intent
could still violate Title VI I. 57 The Court also relied on the legislative
history of the Tower amendments to support the position taken by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") 58 that
Congress intended section 703(h) to protect only job-related tests.
Reading the congressional debate as a concern that Title VII would
invalidate job-related tests and interpreting the first Tower amend-
ment to protect only job-related tests, the Court concluded that the
second amendment had the same purpose:
Senator Tower's original amendment provided in
part that a test would be permissible "if . . . in the case of
any individual who is seeking employment with such em-
ployer, such test is designed to determine or predict
whether such individual is suitable or trainable with re-
spect to his employment in the particular business or en-
terprise involved . . . ." This language indicates that Sen-
ator Tower's aim was simply to make certain that job
related tests would be permitted. The opposition to the
amendment was based on its loose wording which the
proponents of Title VII feared would be susceptible of
misinterpretation. The final amendment, which was ac-
56 110 CON G, REC. 13724 (,tune 13, 1964).
" Griggs v, Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (emphasis on term "used" added
by Court).
58 The CoUrt cited to the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing, which were issued
in pamphlet form on Aug. 24, 1966, but never formally published, and the Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (Aug. I, 1970).
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ceptable to all sides, could hardly have required less of a
job relation than the first. 59
The validity of the Court's interpretation of section 703(h)
depends on the accuracy of its interpretation of the initial Tower
amendment. It is certainly possible to read the initial amendment
to protect only job-related tests. The amendment sought to protect
tests designed to "determine or predict whether such individual is
suitable or trainable with respect to his employment in the particular
business or enterprise involved"; this appears to be describing a job-
related test. Perhaps Senator Tower was using the term "profes-
sionally developed" to mean a job-related test. After all, the amend-
ment by its terms did not protect all tests, only those that were
professionally developed. Additionally, neither Senator Tower nor
other members of Congress seemed to contemplate that this amend-
ment would insulate tests that were completely arbitrary or unre-
lated to the requirements of the job for which they were imposed.
On the other hand, the use of the term "designed" in the
proposed amendment may suggest that a challenged test would be
valid as long as it was "designed" to measure the requirements of a
job; that is, it was not intentionally discriminatory. This second
interpretation finds more support in the remarks of Senator Tower
introducing the amendment." Senator Tower stressed that the test
in the Motorola case was not "designed" to discriminate and that
employers would be protected under his amendment if the em-
ployer gave the same test to everybody, without regard to race or
other protected characteristics."'
The proper interpretation of this legislative history concerning
employment tests is critical to the existence of the disparate impact
theory under Title VII. If the initial Tower amendment is inter-
preted to protect all tests, whether or not they are job-related, the
legislative history seems to reflect a congressional judgment that
such tests should not be subject to challenge unless employers used
them to discriminate. If, however, the initial Tower amendment
sought to protect only job-related tests, then the legislative history
seems to reflect a congressional judgment that job-related tests
needed to be protected by amendment because they might other-
wise be invalidated by Title VII simply because of the effects of
such tests. The legislative history contains a good deal of support
59 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 435, 436 & n.12.
66 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
61
 110 CONG. REC. 11251 (May 19, 1964).
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for both positions; it is difficult to say which is the correct interpre-
tation.
3. Congressional Concerns About Seniority Provisions
One other portion of Title VITs legislative history may be read
as a rejection of the disparate impact theory. Opponents of Title
VII expressed concern that the legislation would destroy seniority
rights. 62 In response to this concern, Senator Clark introduced a
memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice concerning
the effect of Title VII on the rights of organized labor, including
seniority rights.
That memorandum took the position that Title VII would have
no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it took effect. The
memorandum noted that Title VII only prohibited discrimination
based on race, religion, sex, and national origin and that an em-
ployee laid off under a last hired, first fired scheme would not be
discriminated against based on such a protected characteristic, "even
in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date
of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes." 63 The
memorandum contrasted this situation with one in which the se-
niority system itself was discriminatory, such as a rule stating that
all employees of one race would be laid off before all employees of
another race, which would be unlawful under Title VII. 64 The
memorandum concluded: "Employers and labor organizations
would simply be under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes
based on their race. Any differences in treatment based on estab-
lished seniority rights would not be based on race and would not
be forbidden by the title." "6 The implication of this memorandum
is that only provisions of seniority systems that are intentionally
discriminatory would violate Title VII, and that Title VII would
not be violated by the adverse effects that such provisions would
have on minorities.
Senator Humphrey provided the same message in his expla-
nation of a provision on seniority systems in the Mansfield-Dirksen
substitute amendment, ultimately incorporated in section 703(h) of
Title VII. That section provides that it is not unlawful for an em-
ployer to provide different terms and conditions of employment in
62 See 110 CONG. REG'. 486-89 (Jan. 15, 1904) (remarks of Sen. Hill).
" 110 CONG. Rm. 7205-07 (Apr. 8, 1964).
64 Id.
65 Id.
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reliance on a bona fide seniority system, "provided that such dif-
ferences are not the result of an intention to discriminate." 66 The
Senator explained the change as follows: "[T]his provision makes
clear that it is only discriminatiqn on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, that is forbidden by the title. The change
does not narrow application of the title, but merely clarifies its
present intent and effect." 67 What Senator Humphrey appears to
be saying is that, even prior to this amendment, reliance on seniority
systems would have been unlawful only if accompanied by an intent
to discriminate and that the effects of such systems were not action-
able under Title VII.
4. Congressional Concern About Quotas
Commentators have also argued that the disparate impact the-
ory is inconsistent with Congress's concern that employers not be
held liable based solely on racial imbalance in their workforces and
that employers not be required to adopt quotas to escape liability
under Title VII. Persons taking this position argue that because
claims of disparate impact are based partially on proof of imbalances
in the workforce between minority and majority groups, the use of
that theory will cause employers to use quota hiring to eliminate
the imbalance and thereby prevent successful claims of disparate
impact."
There is no dispute that a number of members of Congress
expressed concerns that the enactment of Title VII would lead to
quota hiring." Although proponents of Title VII insisted that Title
VII did not require racial balance and that quota hiring would not
be required—or allowed—by the bil1, 7° an amendment was proposed
66 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1988).
67
 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (June 4, 1964).
68 See Gold, supra note 10, at 503-11 (Congress's clear rejection of quotas is inconsistent
with the disparate impact model because that model allows a finding of a violation of the act
from the existence of a racial imbalance in the workforce); Rutherglen, supra note 12, at
1313, 1345 (heavy burden of business justification placed on the defendant would run afoul
of anti-quota provisions of § 703(j) by requiring employers to adopt preferences to avoid a
finding or adverse impact).
69 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1645 (Feb. 1, 1964) (statement of Rep. Alger) (act will "force
employers to hire workers on the bases of color rather than ability"); 110 CoNG, Rs:c. 2557-
58 (Feb. 8, 1964) (statements of Reps. Dowdy and Ashmore) (bill would require racial balance
in unions); 110 CONG. REC. 2576 (Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep. Polo (bill would require
racial balance in all employer job categories); 1 10 CONG. REC. 7902 (Apr. 14, 1964) (statements
of Sens. Long and Thurmond) (act would require racial balance).
70 Senators Case and Clark addressed the argument that Title V11 would require
employers to maintain a racial balance in their Interpretative Memorandum on Title VII:
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to address these concerns. 7 ' The essence of this amendment was
ultimately included in Title VII as section 7030), which provides
that:
(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-
preted to require an employer . . . to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,
State, section, or other area, or in the available work force
in any community, State, section, or other area. 72
Senator Humphrey indicated that this amendment did not ef-
fect a substantive change in the statute, but that it was included in
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial
balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain
a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of
title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire
or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimi-
nation is prohibited as to any individual. While the presence or absence of other
members Of the same minority group in the work force may be a relevant factor
in determining whether in a given case a deCision to hire or to refuse to hire
was based on race, color, etc., it is only one factor, and the question in each case
would be whether that individual was discriminated against.
l0 CONG. Rae. 7215 (April 8, 1964); accord 110 Cost°, Ric. 7218 (April 8, 1964) (Sen.
Clark's response to questions on Tide VII raised by Sen. Dirkscn); 110 CONC. REc. 8921
(April 23, 1964) (statement by Sen. Williams); 110 CONG. REc. 9881-82 (May 4, 1964)
(statement by Sen. Allott).
'n In proposing amendment 568, Senator Allott indicated that he did not believe that
Title VII would result in quota hiring, but that he was proposing the amendment to allay
the fears of employers that quota hiring would he required by Title VII. That amendment
provided that:
The court shall not find, in any civil action brought under this title, that the
respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint solely on the basis of evidence that an imbalance exists
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer ... in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, without
supporting evidence of another nature that the respondent has engaged in or
is engaging in such practice.
110 CONG. Rae. 9881-82 (May 4, 1964).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
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order to expressly state that "title VII does not require an employer
to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving
preferential treatment to any individual or group." 73
This legislative history and the presence of section 703(j) in the
statute is in no way inconsistent with the disparate impact theory.
Section 703(j) indicates that employers will not be required to en-
gage in "preferential treatment" to avoid racial imbalance. The duty
imposed on the employer not to use non-job-related selection de-
vices that disproportionately affect members of protected groups
does not require preferential treatment, but merely requires that
the employer provide equal opportunity to minorities and nonmi-
norities by not unjustifiably excluding minorities from considera-
tion. Neither does the disparate impact theory hold employers liable
for violations of the statute merely because of an imbalance in the
work force: it is not the imbalance itself that creates liability on the
part of the employer but the discriminatory acts of the employer,
whether intentional or unintentional, that cause that imbalance.
The argument that the disparate impact theory should not be
used because it might prompt employers to adopt quotas to avoid
liability is similarly unpersuasive. The precise argument could be
made, and was made, about the disparate treatment theory. In
arguing against Title VII, Senator Smathers said:
[T]here is no question in my mind that when a man has
to submit his records, and he has always hired a certain
group of citizens, or a certain type of citizens, to work for
him, and the Government goes through his records and
says, "You have employed all of one kind; you must have
in your heart a feeling of discrimination against persons
of another type," that persons will have to protect himself
against such a situation . . . So he will protect himself by
hiring a certain number of colored people in order to
keep the majesty and might of the Federal law and its
large bureaucracy off his neck. 74
Senator Smathers was arguing that prohibiting intentional discrim-
ination would result in use of quotas by employers trying to escape
liability under the act, but no one would argue that Congress meant
73 110 CONG. REC. 12723 ( June 4, 1964) (explanation of Sen. Humphrey of proposed
amendments to Title VII).
74
 110 CONG. REC. 7800 (1964) (statement of Sen. Smathers); see also 110 CONC. REC.
13076 (1964) (statement of Sen. Sparkman) (racial imbalance could be used as evidence of
discrimination).
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to disavow the disparate treatment theory by enacting section 703(j).
That some employers might resort to quotas to escape litigation or
liability under the act does not mean that use of the disparate impact
theory—or the disparate treatment theory—requires quotas or ra-
cial balance in the workforce. 75
5. The General Purpose of Congress in Enacting Title VII
The legislative history of Title VII does not conclusively estab-
lish whether the disparate impact theory was intended to be a theory
of discrimination under Title VII. Although portions of the legis-
lative history support the theory, the overall tenor of the debates
suggests that at least some of Title VII's supporters contemplated
that only intentional discrimination would violate the statute.
On the other hand, some of Title V II's opponents seemed very
concerned-about the absence of a definition of discrimination in the
statute, 76 perhaps indicating that they believed that more than the
traditional concept of discrimination was encompassed in the lan-
guage of the proposed legislation. The concerns expressed about
the potential effects of Title VII on employer selection criteria and
seniority systems also support this view because those amendments
would have been entirely unnecessary if only intentional discrimi-
75 Even the United States Supreme Court has bought into the quota argument to justify
its imposition of heavier evidentiary burdens on the plaintiff and lighter burdens on the
defendant for disparate impact claims. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, the plurality
gave the following justification for the evidentiary standards that it was imposing on disparate
impact claims:
If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means
or avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such mea-
sures will be widely adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure
that its programs are discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful
to ensure that the quotas are met. Allowing the evolution of disparate impact
analysis to lead to this result would be contrary to Congress' clearly expressed
intent, and should not he the effect of our decision today.
487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2122
(1989).
Additionally, concern about quotas has been one of the major objections expressed by
opponents of the Civil Rights Act. of 1990, which would legislatively overrule the Wards Cove
case. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 53144 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
136 CONG. REC. 59339-40 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); 136
CONG. REC. 59817 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Coats); 136 CONG. REC. H6798
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
76 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7218 (Apr. 8, 1964) (response of Sen. Clark to questions
raised about Title VII by Sen. Dirksen); 110 CONG. Rae. 11251 (May 19, 1964) (letter from
Robert C. Nichols, Program Director of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation, to John
G. Tower, May 6, 1964).
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nation were forbidden by the statute. By their very nature, those
type of employer practices are subject to challenge precisely because
of their effects; they are neutral practices that would generally be
objectionable, if at all, because of their effects. Additionally, those
amendments, which protected employer use of "bona fide" seniority
systems and "professionally developed ability test[s],"" suggest that
not all such systems and tests are protected by the statute, but only
those that meet the qualifying terms of those provisions. This cer-
tainly leaves open the possibility that employers may be found liable
under Title VII because of the effects of tests that are not "profes-
sionally developed" and seniority systems that are not "bona fide."
The presence .of those provisions in Title VII, therefore, provides
additional statutory support for the disparate impact theory.
Even if one were to read the legislative history as an implicit
rejection of the disparate impact theory, one would not be lead
inevitably to the conclusion that the disparate impact theory has no
place in Title VII jurisprudence. On the contrary, the concerns in
Congress and elsewhere that culminated in the enactment of Title
VII went beyond blatantly racially restrictive hiring and other em-
ployment practices. There is no doubt that some members of Con-
gress supported the proposed legislation because of their views
concerning the morality of intentional discrimination based on ra-
cial classifications. 78 It also appears, however, that the legislation was
motivated in part by the belief that racial discrimination in employ-
ment had to be eradicated because of its economic effects on blacks
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
7' Senator Clark emphasized the moral issue of race discrimination in response to an
amendment to delete Title VII from the proposed statute:
The moral question raised by the bill is particularly applicable to the fair
employment practices title. The moral issue is clear, indeed. It is merely a
question of right and wrong. We cannot duck h. There is no way we can avoid
searching out our own consciences. The bill clearly raises this important moral
question.
We had before us, in hearings held by the committee, eloquent and artic-
ulate representatives of the churches of the United States ........Ihe represen-
tatives of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Synagogue Council of
America, and the National Council of Churches of Christ in America said:
The religious conscience of America condemns racism as blasphemy against
God. It recognizes that the racial segregation and discrimination that flow
from it are a denial of the worth which God has given to all persons. We
hold that God is the father if all men. Consequently in every person there
is an innate dignity which is the basis of human rights. There rights con-
stitute a moral claim which must be honored both by all persons and by
the state. Denial of such rights is immoral.
110 CONG. REC. 13080 ( June 9, 1964).
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and society as a whole. President John F. Kennedy, in a message to
Congress urging the enactment of a civil rights bill, offered the
following justifications for putting an end to racial discrimination:
Race discrimination hampers our economic growth
by preventing the maximum development of our man-
power, by contradicting at home the message we preach
abroad. It mars the atmosphere of a united and classless
society in which this Nation rose to greatness. It increases
the costs of public welfare, crime, delinquency, and dis-
order. Above all, it is wrong. 7°
This concern with the economic consequences of racial discrim-
ination in employment was echoed by members of the House Ju-
diciary Committee in their additional comments explaining the re-
port of the Committee on Title VII. They indicated that the "failure
of our society to extend job opportunities to the Negro is an eco-
nomic waste" because of effects on the gross national product,
welfare, crime, and shortages of skilled employees and that
In]ational prosperity will be increased through the proper training
of Negroes for more skilled employment together with the removal
of barriers for obtaining such employment." 8°
Congress's concern and its purpose in enacting Title VII were
not just to eliminate blatant racial discrimination, but to create
equality of employment opportunity. 81 Equalization of employment
opportunity requires not only that minority group members not be
excluded from consideration for employment, but that they be
allowed to compete on an equitable basis with nonminority group
7" Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights (February 28, 1963), JonN F. KENNEDY
PHIL PAPERS 221, 222 (1963). President Kennedy in his statement to Congress made reference
to both lack of equal treatment and lack of equal opportunity for blacks. Id.
5" 1-I.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (additional views on H.R. 7152
of Hon. William M. McCullough, Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon. William T. Cahill, Hon. Garner
E. Shrivel -, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles McMathias, Hon. James E. Bromwell),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. Com; CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487, 2513-16, and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLES VII AND XI 01, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 2122, 2149.
xi The legislkive history of Title VII is filled with references to the need for equal
employment opportunity and the removal of barriers to minority employment. See, e.g., H.R.
REP, No, 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (additional views on H.R. 7152 of Hon.
William M. McCullough, Hon. John V. Lindsay, lion. William T. Cahill, Hon. Garner E.
Shriver, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles McMathias, Hon. James E. Bromwell), reprinted
in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487, 2513-16, and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF TID: Civet. RIGHTS Am' OF 1964 at 2122, 2149, 2151; 110 CONG. REC.
1635, 1636 (Feb. 1, 1964) (statement of Sen. Reid); 110 CONG. REC. 6552, 6553 (Mar. 30,
1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CoNG. REc. 12598 ( June 3, 1964) (statement of
Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REC. 13079 ( June 9, 1064) (statement of Sen. Clark).
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members. The mere prohibition of intentional discrimination would
not meet this goal. President Lyndon B. Johnson spoke of the need
to go beyond intentional discrimination in the following terms:
"Freedom from discrimination is not enough. There must be free-
dom from the disadvantage that 200 years of discrimination helped
create. There must be freedom of opportunity, freedom to work." 82
Employer actions taken without a discriminatory intent, but
which have an adverse impact on certain protected groups, have as
devastating—if not more devastating—consequences for the job op-
portunities of racial minorities." Blatant discrimination was not the
only cause of the widespread unemployment and underemploy-
ment of blacks and other minorities cited in the legislative history
of Title VII as justification for enacting the statute."
The proponents of Title VII were committed to eliminating
the disadvantages suffered by racial minorities and guaranteeing
equal employment opportunity. This commitment required not only
that intentional discrimination be prohibited, but also that uninten-
tional actions of employers in adopting unjustified employment
criteria that excluded disproportionate numbers of minorities be
"2
 Special Message to the Congress Proposing Further Legislation To Strengthen Civil
Rights (Apr. 28, 1966), LYNDON B. JOHNSON Pun. PAPERS 461, 466 (1966).
1" The EEOC recognized the pervasiveness of unintentional discrimination in the early
years of its existence:
The starting point for an effective program must, of course, be the fact of
discrimination in the American economy. Some of it is deliberate, even willful;
much of it is institutionalized, an almost unconscious acceptance of habitual
ways of recruiting and promoting.
Even though they are not consciously intended to discriminate, traditional
attitudes and patterns of conduct in business, employment agencies and labor
organizations may have the effect of barring minorities from employment op-
portunities as surely as overt discrimination itself.
1 EEOC Ann. Rep. 7, 8 (1967).
It is clear from later reports of the EEOC that the "unconscious" discrimination of which
the agency spoke is what became known as disparate impact:
Nationwide, discriminatory behavior—some overt, much of it more subtle
and more sweeping—occurs daily. Employers and unions require each new
candidate to secure a recommendation from a current employee or union
member, while the current workforce is all white; verbal aptitude tests are given
for jobs requiring few verbal skills so that jobs are unreasonably denied to
Spanish-surnamed Americans achieving low test scores; women are barred from
jobs because of unrealistic limitations on weightlifting.
2 EEOC Ann, Rep. 1 (1968).
84 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REG,. 6547-48 (Mar. 30, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey);
110 CONG. REG. 7204-740 (Apr. 8, 1964) (statement of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REC. 12598
( June 3, 1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
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eliminated. The disparate impact theory of discrimination therefore
was essential to the purposes of Congress and, in this broad sense,
is consistent with congressional intent.
It is true, to a large extent, that addressing the question of
legislative intent in this manner requires one to ask not so much
what Congress did as what it would have done if it had directly
focused on the fact that prohibiting intentional discrimination alone
would not result in equal employment opportunity." There is in
fact evidence that Congress did not fully understand the nature of
racial discrimination in employment at the time that it enacted Title
VII;s6 members of Congress later admitted this lack of understand-
85 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,386-87 (1977) (Marshall, J„ concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280,285 (1933)).
In Teamsters, Justice Marshall addressed the issue of Congress's intent with respect to the
protection of seniority systems under Title VII that. perpetuated the effects of pre-Act
discrimination. In concluding that Congress did not directly address the issue and could not
have intended such a result, Justice Marshall said:
Prior to 1965 blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans who were able to find
employment were assigned the lowest paid, most menial jobs in many industries
throughout. the Nation but especially in the South . . . The Court holds, in
essence, that while after 1965 these incumbent employees are entitled to an
equal opportunity to advance to more desirable jobs, to take advantage of that
opportunity they must pay a price: they must surrender the seniority they have
accumulated in their old jobs. For many, the price will be too high, and they
will be locked into their previous positions. Even those willing to pay the price
will have to reconcile themselves to being forever behind subsequently hired
whites who were not discriminatorily assigned, Thus equal opportunity will
remain a distant dream for all incumbent employees.
I am aware of nothing in the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
to suggest that if Congress had focused on this fact it nonetheless would have
decided to write off an entire generation of minority group employees. Nor
can 1 believe that the Congress that enacted Title VII would have agreed to
postpone for one generation the achievement of economic equality. The backers
of that Title viewed economic equality as both a practical necessity and a moral
imperative. They were well aware of the corrosive impact employment discrim-
ination has on its victims, and on society generally. They sought, therefore, to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens and to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis-
crimination. In short, Congress wanted to enable black workers to assume their
rightful place in society.
431 U.S. at 387-88 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and
footnotes omitted). Obviously, much of what Justice Marshall says about congressional intent
in this context is also relevant to the issue of whether Congress would have approved the
disparate impact model if it correctly perceived the need for such a theory to accomplish the
goal of equal employment opportunity.
8." Professor Belton indicated in a slightly different context—the permissibility of vol-
untary affirmative action under Title VII—that "Congress failed to bridge the gap between
equality as a theoretical concept and equality as a reality for blacks." Belton, Discrimination
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ing in connection with amendments to the statute." Therefore, even
if Congress did not directly authorize the disparate impact theory
of employment discrimination, one can argue that if Congress had
recognized the need for such a theory to meet its purposes of
ensuring equal employment opportunity, it would have approved
that theory.
This method of construction of legislative intent is not un-
known to the judiciary, particularly with respect to issues of civil
rights. The Supreme Court took essentially this approach in United
Steelworkers v. Weber, in trying to determine whether Congress in-
tended voluntary affirmative action to be lawful under Title VI I."
Although the Court did not argue that Congress had specifically
contemplated the issue of affirmative action, that is, discrimination
against whites, the Court concluded that affirmative action must be
permissible under the statute, holding that Congress could not have
intended to prevent employers from "taking effective steps to ac-
complish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve.""
Interpreting statutes liberally in such a way as to be consistent with
the purpose or objective of the statute is an established method of
statutory construction."
and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.1.. REV.
531, 591 (1981). He went on to note, with express reference to the disparate impact model:
[A]s courts, enforcement agencies, and others gained experience under Title
VII, it became overwhelmingly clear that confining the application of the statute
to a neutral nondiscriminatory standard would fail to achieve meaningful em-
ployment opportunities for blacks, As Chief Justice Burger noted in Griggs, a
broader reading was required in order that Title VII "not provide equality of
opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and fox
These concerns lay behind the line of cases beginning with, and perhaps
more clearly exemplified by Griggs. These cases imported into Title VII law a
number of mechanisms that nudged open the judicial door so that the statute
might achieve its primary purpose. These mechanisms included, among others,
the disparate impact analysis and related statistical presumptions, rather than
proof of intent. Devices such as the disparate impact analysis did not relieve
black plaintiffs from having to establish that the defendant had unlawfully
discriminated. They did, however, substantially broaden the meaning of "un-
lawful employment discrimination" in order that Title VII might at least begin
to reduce the racial disparaties[sic] that so concerned Congress.
Id. at 596-97.
' 7 See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2143-44.
88
 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" Id. at 204.
9') See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).
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This interpretation of Title VII is consistent with the position
taken by the EEOC, the agency created by Title VII to enforce the
statute.9 ' The EEOC indicated that it believed one of its "primary
responsibilities . . . inherent in Title VII is the duty to contribute
to the legal definition of employment discrimination." 92 In fulfilling
this duty, the Commission took the position that proof of intent to
discriminate was not necessary to prove a violation of Title VII:
If a company, for example, imposes a qualification for
employment or promotion that bears no valid relationship
to performance in the respective job and has the effect of
excluding black people from that job, then such a require-
ment violated Title VII regardless of whether the em-
ployer had the specific goal of excluding Negroes. By
establishing through the Commission decision process,
with growing support in the courts, the concept that cer-
tain employment practices may be in violation of Title VII
not because they constitute disparate treatment but because
they produce unjustifiably disparate effect, EEOC has
brought equal job opportunity a large step closer to real-
ity."
What the EEOC was articulating, two years prior to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Griggs, was the disparate impact theory;
namely, that the effects, rather than the intent, of employer action
could violate Title VII's ban on racial discrimination. The EEOC
considered its interpretation of the statute to be fully consistent with
both the purpose of Congress to ensure equal job opportunity and
its charge to bring about meaningful results with respect to em-
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 705, 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1988).
" 3 EEOC Ann. Rep. 12 (1969). Professor Blumrosen argues that the EEOC's efforts
to give substance to the meaning of discrimination in Title VII was appropriate, given
Congress's failure to seriously address that legal concept:
Congressmen can react to social needs. Their administrative staffs and
interest groups can prepare studies, data, and arguments. The Justice Depart-
ment lawyers can prepare scholarly memoranda for use in the heat of the
political debate, and legal and other academicians can review these proposals
and recommend changes. Out of these ingredienti the legislative product
emerges. But the legislation itself is far from the last word. The application of
the legislation to specific situations remains. The administrative and judicial
processes work between the cup of legislation and the lip of life. The jurispru-
dential conceptions applied at this point determine the operative effect of the
statute.
Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 99.
93 3 EEOC Ann. Rep. 12 (1969) (emphasis in original).
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ployment discrimination. 94 The United States Supreme Court con-
firmed the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 95
C. Griggs v. Duke Power Company
The Griggs case did not start out as a disparate impact case.
The case was brought as a class action by thirteen of the fourteen
black employees of Duke Power Company. 96 The plaintiffs' claim
was that certain selection criteria imposed by the defendant pre-
vented black employees from transferring out of the lower-paid all
black department, to which they had been discriminatorily assigned
because of their race prior to the effective date of Title VII, and
that these practices were therefore unlawful because they gave pres-
ent effect to past discrimination. 97
The defendant's work force was divided into five different
departments, in order of descending hierarchy: Operations, Main-
tenance, Laboratory and Test, Coal Handling, and Labor. 98 In 1955,
the defendant had initiated a requirement of a high school diploma
or its equivalent for employment in all departments other than the
Labor Department. The requirement applied both to new hires into
the higher-paid, non-Labor departments and to transfers between
departments, but did not affect the continued employment of cur-
94 See I EEOC Ann. Rep. 36 (1967).
9" 40l U.S. 424 (1971).
96
 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244, 245 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
9' Id. at 247. The plaintiff's authority for the proposition that the present effects of
past discrimination were actionable under Title VII was Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), a case in which the district court invalidated provisions of a
seniority system that served to perpetuate the effects of the employer's prior practices of
racially segregating its departments by restricting transfers between departments without loss
of departmental seniority. The district court stated:
The act does not condone present differences that are the result of intention
to discriminate before the effective date of the act, although such a provision
could have been included in the act had Congress so intended. The court holds
that the present differences in departmental seniority of Negroes and whites
that result from the company's intentional, racially discriminatory hiring policy
before January I, 1966 are not validated by the proviso of § 703(h).
Id. at 518 (emphasis omitted).
The Quarles court's reliance on the present effects of past discrimination theory with
respect to seniority systems was disapproved by the United States Supreme Court in Teams-
ters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.28, 348-355 (1977). Although apparently approving
the "present effects of past discrimination" theory generally, the Court held that § 703(h)
prevented the application of that theory to invalidate bona fide seniority systems. Id. at 352—
53.
Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 245.
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rent employees in these departments." The Labor Department, for
which the high school diploma requirement did not apply, was
essentially all black; the other departments were all white. The
district court found that the defendant had, prior to the effective
date of Title VII, discriminatorily restricted blacks to the Labor
Department.'"
On July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, the defendant
added a new requirement for employment in any department other
than the Labor Department. New employees hired into the other
departments were required to obtain satisfactory scores on two tests,
the E.F. Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test, Form AA. Current employees were not re-
quired to pass these tests to transfer between departments and
remained eligible to transfer if they had a high school diploma.m
In September 1965, the policy on transfers between departments
was amended, at the instigation, of employees in the Coal Handling
Department, to allow persons hired before September 1, 1965 who
did not have a high school diploma to become eligible for transfer
by obtaining satisfactory scores on the two professionally developed
ability tests. 102
The basis of the plaintiff's claim was that because they had
been discriminatorily restricted to the lower-paid Labor Department
because of their race, the application of the high school diploma or
testing requirement to them prevented their employment in the
higher-paid departments, while white employees originally hired
into those departments without a high school diploma were eligible
for positions in those higher-paid departments.'" The plaintiffs
argued that, because the present practices of the defendant were
"tainted by prior discriMinatory practices," they were unlawful.'"
The district court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim
for a violation of Title VII because the statute was prospective
only.'''`' The district court also noted that the challenged require-
" Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (4th Cir. 1970).
in" Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 247.
lin /d. at 245-46; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971). Effective
July 2, 1965, new employees hired into the Labor Department were required to obtain a
satisfactory score on the Revised Beta Test. That requirement was not challenged by the
plaintiffs. Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 245.
l"2 Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 246.
'°3 Id. at 247.
104 Id.
i" Id. at 248. The district court stated:
In providing for prospective application only, Congress faced the cold hard
fact of past discrimination and the resulting inequities. Congress also realized
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ments had been imposed "without any intention or design to dis-
criminate against Negro employees" and therefore were lawful.'"
The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiffs
"have failed to carry the burden of proving that the defendant has
intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race or
color." 107 The district court in Griggs clearly rejected any suggestion
that the effects of employer practices, as opposed to the intent
behind such practices, could constitute a violation of Title VII.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court in part, the majority of the court
also did not endorse the disparate impact theory. Instead, its deci-
sion was an endorsement of the plaintiffs' "present effects of past
discrimination" theory. The appellate court noted that, as to the
plaintiffs without a high school diploma who had been hired prior
to the implementation of that requirement, both of the challenged
selection criteria locked them into the lower-paid positions in which
prior discrimination had placed them and were therefore unlaw-
ful.'"
That the court of appeals was not applying the disparate impact
theory is made clear by its treatment of the remaining plaintiffs,
those employees without high school diplomas who were hired sub-
sequent to the implementation of that requirement. The court said
that, to determine if the educational and testing requirements were
valid, it had to determine "whether Duke had a valid business
purpose in adopting such requirements or whether the company
merely used the requirements to discriminate." 10' The majority dis-
counted the notion that those requirements could be invalidated
"merely because of Negroes' cultural and educational disadvantages
the practical impossibility of eradicating all the consequences of past discrimi-
nation. The 1964 Act has as its purpose the absolution of the policies of dis-
crimination which produced the inequities.
Id.
1 °' Id. at 248, 250. The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant's use of the Wonderlic
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension tests was unlawful because they were not job-
related, The district court agreed, stating that "Nile two tests used by the defendant were
never intended to accurately measure the ability of an employee to perform the particular
job available." Id. at 250. The district court nevertheless held that § 703(h) of Title VII
protected all professionally developed ability tests, not just job-related tests, unless used for
the purpose of discrimination. Id.
107 Id. at 251-52.
L" Griggs, 420 F.2d 1255, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1970).
1 g Id. at 1232.
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due to past discrimination," indicating that the plaintiffs had con-
ceded as much in their brief.lto
The court concluded that the challenged criteria had been
adopted with a "legitimate business need" and without any intention
to discriminate. The court noted that the requirement of a high
school diploma was adopted nine years prior to the passage of Title
VII and that the requirement had disadvantaged white employees
as well as black employees. The court also noted that the company
had generally acted in good faith with respect to employment since
the effective date of the statute and that the company had a policy
of paying a major portion of the expenses incurred by an employee
in securing a high school diploma or its equivalent)" The court
indicated that the high school diploma requirement was supported
by an "obvious" business need because it allowed the employer to
hire only employees who had a reasonable chance of being pro-
moted to higher positions. 12 Finally, the court concluded that the
testing requirement did not violate Title VII because the tests were
professionally developed, there was no discrimination in the admin-
no Id. The portion of the plaintiffs' brief quoted by the majority does not support the
contention that the plaintiffs admitted that only intentional discrimination was unlawful
under Title Vii. The plaintiffs argued that:
An employer is, of course, permitted to set educational or test requirements
that fulfill genuine business needs. For example, an employer may require a
fair typing test of applicants for secretarial positions. It may well be that, because
of long-standing inequality in educational and cultural opportunities available
to Negroes, proportionately Fewer Negro applicants than white can pass such a
test. But where business need can be shown, as it can where typing ability is
necessary for performance as a secretary, the fact that the test tends to exclude
more Negroes than whites does not make it discriminatory. We do not even
wish to suggest that employers are required by law to compensate for centuries
of discrimination by hiring Negro applicants who are incapable of doing the
job. But when a test or educational requirement is not shown to be based on
business steed, as in the instant case, it measures not ability to do a job but
rather the extent to which persons have acquired educational and cultural
background which had been denied to Negroes.
Id. (quoting Brief of Appellants) (emphasis omitted). The import of the plaintiffs' argument
was that job-related tests—those hissed on business need and that measure skills necessary
for a particular position—are lawful under Title VII even when they do have adverse effects
on blacks, but that such adverse effects are unlawful under Title VII if the test is not job-
related.
" 1 Id. at 1232-33 & im.3, 4, 5 & 6.
In Id. at 1232 n.2. It is possible to read the court's language concerning the "legitimate
business need" supporting the policy as finding the "business necessity" and "job-relatedness"
that has traditionally been required under the disparate impact theory. The court scented,
however, to rely on the existence of a business need for the requirements as evidence that
the requirements were adopted for that purpose and not for a discriminatory purpose. Id.
at 1232-33.
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istration or scoring of the tests, and the testing requirement was
applied both to white and black employees." 5
Judge Sobeloff, in his concurring opinion to the decision of the
court of appeals, relied on the disparate impact theory." 4 He indi-
cated that the issue presented by the case was "the use of allegedly
objective employment criteria resulting in the denial to Negroes of
jobs for which they are potentially qualified."'" Although he sug-
gested the possibility that the objective employment criteria used by
Duke Power Company might have been adopted precisely because
of their effect on blacks, he did not rely on that possibility to support
his position that those criteria were unlawful. Instead, he indicated
that the motive of the employer was entirely irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether the criteria violated Title VII." 6
Judge Sobeloff argued that Title VII prohibited not only overt
discrimination but also neutral practices that disadvantaged blacks
and were not supported by business necessity.''' He indicated that,
although Title VII does not require that minorities be given pref-
erential treatment to make up for centuries of discrimination, it did
prohibit the use of tests or other criteria that measured educational
and cultural differences caused by that past discrimination when
they were irrelevant to the ability to perform the job in question.'"
", Id. at 1233,1235-36. The court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion (and the position of
the EEOC) that only job-related tests were protected under Title VII, finding that claim not
supported by the legislative history. Id. at 1234-35.
114 See generally id. at 1237-38 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In addition to relying on what came to be known as the disparate impact model, Judge
Sobeloff also indicated that Duke Power had violated Title VII under the "present effects of
past discrimination" theory. Id. at 1247-48. Those two conclusions that Title VII had been
violated appear to be independent of each other. Id, at 1248.
" 5 Id, at 1237.
"6 Id. at 1238 & n.4.
IL? Id. at 1238-41. Although he cited other cases in support of his position, such as
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), and Local 189 v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), neither of those cases was truly a disparate impact case.
Instead, those cases were "present effects of past discrimination" cases, in which the effects
of' prior intentionally discriminatory employer action were challenged. Neither of those cases
suggested that the intent of the employer was wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether Title
VII was violated.
" 0 See generally id. at 1240-44 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He did not find 703(h) regarding professionally developed ability tests to be to the contrary,
based on his view that that section was only intended to protect job-related tests. In reaching
this conclusion, Judge Sobeloff relied both on the EEOC guidelines to this effect, which he
viewed as entitled to great deference and as making "eminent common sense," and on the
legislative history of Title VII. Id. Finally, he concluded that the selection criteria used by
Duke Power Company were not job-related or supported by business need. Id. at 1244-46.
December 1990]	 DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY	 39
He gave a particularly compelling justification as to why Title VII •
must reach both intended and unintended discrimination:
A man who is turned down for a job does not care
whether it was because the employer did not like his skin
color or because, although the employer professed impar-
tiality, procedures were used which had the effect of dis-
criminating against the applicant's race. Likewise irrele-
vant to Title VII is the state of mind of an employer whose
policy, in practice, effects discrimination. The law will not
tolerate unnecessarily harsh treatment of Negroes even
though an employer does not plan this result. The use of
criteria that are not backed by valid and corroborated
business needs cannot be allowed, regardless of subjective
intent.''"
Judge Sobeloff recognized the significance of the disparate impact
theory to the purposes of Title VII: "On this issue hangs the vitality
of the employment provision (Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act: whether the Act shall remain a potent tool for equalization of
employment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous but
hollow rhetoric." 12 "
The separate opinion of Judge Sobeloff proved instrumental
to the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the disparate
impact model in Griggs, and much of his analysis appears in that
decision. The Supreme Court focused from the outset of its decision
on the issue that is the core of judge Sobeloff's opinion and of the
disparate impact model—whether Title VII can be violated in the
absence of discriminatory intent or purpose. ' 21
The Court had no trouble concluding that discriminatory intent
was not a requirement for violation of Title VII. Focusing on Con-
119 Id. at 1246.
120 Id. at 1237-38.
121 The Supreme Court described the issues before the Court as follows:
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the District Court was correct in its
conclusion that there was no showing of a racial purpose or invidious intent in
the adoption of the high school diploma requirement or general intelligence
test and that these standards had been applied fairly to whites and Negroes
alike. It held that, in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, use of such
requirements was permitted by the Act. In so doing, the Court of Appeals
rejected the claim that because these two requirements operated to render
ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of Negroes, they were unlawful
under Title VII unless shown to be job related. We granted the writ on these
claims.
Griggs v. Duke Power Cu., 401 U.S. 424,429 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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gress's objective in enacting the statute, that of achieving equal
employment opportunity and removing barriers to employment of
minorities, the Court held that employment practices that denied
such equal opportunity were unlawful even in the absence of any
discriminatory intent.' 22
 Although the Court initially seemed to be
focusing on the "present effects of past discrimination" theory,'"
the Court went beyond that theory by indicating that the employer's
actions were unlawful not because they carried forward the effects
of prior discrimination by the employer, but because they perpet-
uated the effects of prior societal discrimination.' 24
The Court made clear, however, that the theory that it was
adopting did not require preferential treatment of minorities, only
that "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers" to equal oppor-
tunity for minorities be eliminated.' 25
 The Court drew the line
between permissible and impermissible barriers at the connection
between the challenged requirement and the needs of the job or
the employer's business: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrim-
ination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. if an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."' 26
The Court also addressed the issue of who had the burden of
establishing business necessity: "Congress has placed on the em-
ployer the burden of showing that any given requirement must
have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 127 The
122 Id. at 429-30.
122
 See id. at 426,430. In describing the question on which certiorari was granted, the
Court suggested the relevance of past intentional discrimination by listing as a subpart of
the question that "the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as
part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites." Id. at 426. In describing the
scope of Title VII, the Court indicated that neutral practices "cannot be maintained if they
operated to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
Both of these passages suggested that the existence of prior discrimination might be necessary
to finding the "effects" of discrimination actionable.
124
 Id. at 430.
125 Id. at 930-31.
126 Id. at 431. The Court concluded that the practices at issue here had not been shown
to be job-related, because neither' had been "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it is used." Id. at 431-32. The Court also
addressed and rejected the assertion of the employer that its use of the intelligence tests was
specifically protected by § 703(h), adopting the position of the EEOC that only job-related
tests were protected by that section. Id. at 433-36. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying
text for discussion of the Court's analysis on this issue.
147 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. In practice, the Court also appears to have imposed the
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Court made clear that this burden could not be met simply by
showing that the practice was not discriminatorily motivated, indi-
cating that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unre-
lated to measuring job capability." 128
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court contains pow-
erful policy support for the disparate impact theory, eloquently
describing the need for the theory in order to achieve the purposes
of Title VII. The troublesome aspect of the decision is that virtually
no support is cited for the assertion of the Court that this was what
Congress intended when it enacted Title VII. Given the earlier
discussion in this article of the legislative history of Title VII, 129 this
omission is not surprising.
This lack of express support for the disparate impact theory
does not mean, however, that the decision of the Court is in error.
Indeed, as previously discussed, the Court's analysis of whether
intent must be established to prove a violation of Title VII is in
complete accord with the purposes of Congress in enacting the
statute, if not with its express intent.' 30
burden of proof on the employer, referring to the insufficiency of the justification given by
the employer for imposing the requirements and its failure of proof of job-relatedness. Id.
at 431-32.
' 28 Id. at 432. The Court not only indicated the irrelevance of discriminatory intent, but
suggested that the employer had had no such discriminatory intent, indicating that the
employer had made special efforts to help undereducated employees by financing a portion
of their tuition for high school training. Id. The Court, however, did not rely on other
evidence that might have indicated present discriminatory intent on the part of the employer.
For example, one of the challenged policies of the employer, the implementation of the
intelligence test requirement for new hires, became effective on the very day that Title VII
became effective, id. at 427, perhaps suggesting that there was some connection between the
adoption of the requirement and the fact that the employer could no longer arbitrarily
exclude blacks from the favored departments. See Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 64 (employers
took advantage of one-year delay in effective date of Title VII to adopt seemingly neutral
practices that perpetuated the subordinate position of black employees). Perhaps the fact
that this requirement was not applied to persons like the plaintiffs who were seeking to be
transferred to rather than hired in those departments kept the Court from addressing that
coincidence. Additionally, the Court mentioned in passing but did not rely on the fact that,
even though there were some blacks who met the high school diploma requirement, not a
single black was promoted into one of the higher departments until five months after a
charge had been filed with the EEOC, more than a year after the effective date of Title VII.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427 n.2,
129 See supra notes 32-75 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
42	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32: I
D. The Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972
The concept of disparate impact came before Congress again
during the consideration of what became the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972,"' which amended Title VII. There had
been long-standing efforts to amend Title VII," 2 and hearings on
yet another bill to amend the statute, House Bill 1746, had just
begun when the Supreme Court handed down the decision in
Griggs.' 33 Although the focus of that bill was on expanding the
coverage of Title VII and providing enforcement powers to the
EEOC, members of Congress discussed the Griggs decision and the
disparate impact model that it had adopted in their consideration
of the proposed amendments to Title VII. In its report on House
Bill 1746, the House Committee on Education and Labor discussed
the current understanding of the nature of employment discrimi-
nation:
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employment discrimina-
tion tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the
part of some identifiable individual or organization. It was
thought that a scheme which stressed conciliation rather
than compulsory processes would be more appropriate
for the resolution of this essentially "human" problem.
Litigation, it was thought, would be necessary only on an
occasional basis in the event of determined recalcitrance.
Experience, however, has shown this to be an oversimpli-
fied expectation, incorrect in its conclusions.
Employment discrimination, as . we know today, is a
far more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts
familiar with the subject generally describe the problem
"1 42 U.S.C. §1 2000e to 2000e - 17 (1988).
' 32 Almost as soon as Title VII became effective, congressional efforts to amend the
statute began. In July 1965, barely more than two weeks after the effective date of Title VII,
the House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings on bills aimed at expanding
the coverage of Title VII and strengthening the ability of the EEOC to enforce the provisions
of the statute. Bills to More Effectively Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Race,
Color, Religion, Sex, or National Origin, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 8998 and H.R.
8999 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm: on Education and Labor, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. I (1965); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2c1 Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2138.
" H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMEN. NEWS at 2138.
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in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply
intentional wrongs. The literature on the subject is replete
with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of prior
discriminatory practices through various institutional de-
vices, and testing and validation requirements.' 34
The Committee report cited the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs
as an example of an unlawful practice that required the expert
assistance of the EEOC not only to resolve the problem but also to
identify that the practice was indeed unlawful.' 33
The original version of House Bill 1746 contained a provision
to incorporate the portion of the holding of Griggs concerning the
requirement that professionally developed ability tests be job-re-
lated in order to be lawful under Title NTH. The bill proposed an
amendment to section 703(h) providing that it would not be unlaw-
ful:
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test which is directly related to the de-
termination of bona fide occupational qualifications rea-
sonably necessary to perform the normal duties of the
particular position concerned, Provided, That such test, its
administration, or action upon the results is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 6
131 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Com CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2137, '2143-44.
' 35 Id. There is no question that the Committee was citing Griggs with approval. The
Committee report does not suggest that the holding of Griggs went beyond the prohibition
of discrimination contained in Title VII. In discussing the need to extend the prohibitions
on discrimination contained in Title VII both to state and local employers and to the federal
government, the report noted the presence of both overt and "institutional" discrimination
in those areas, and criticized the Civil Service Commission for assuming that "employment
discrimination is primarily a problem of malicious intent on the part of individuals." Id. at
17, 24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM/N. NEWS at 2152, 2159. None of the
minority views in the report expressed any disapproval of the Griggs decision. See H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (minority views on H.R. 1746), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2167; H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (separate views
of Rep. Green of Oregon), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2176; H.R,
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (individual views of Rep. Mazzoli), reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2177; H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 130
(supplemental views of Reps. John M. Ashbrook and Earl F. Landgrebe), reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2178.
156 H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 CONG. REC. 212 ( Jan. 22, 1971). The Committee
report explained the justification for this amendment:
Section 8 of the bill amends subsection 703(h) of the Act and perfects the
Title VII provisions dealing with testing and apprenticeship training. 'rests,
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Although this amendment ultimately was not adopted, there is no
suggestion in the hearings on the bill that the House's failure to
adopt this amendment indicated any disapproval of the holding of
the Court in Griggs. The provision on job-related tests was dropped
from the bill in the House when an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, House Bill 9247, was offered and adopted. The debate
in the House on the relative merits of the two bills focused on
whether Title VII could be most fairly and effectively enforced
through administrative or judicial processes. No mention was made
during this debate of the portion of House Bill 1746 relating to job-
related tests.' 37 In fact, with only limited exception, the little dis-
cussion of Griggs that occurred in the House debate was favorable. 138
The debate in the Senate paralleled that in the House, focusing
on whether there should 'be administrative or judicial enforcement
while they are a useful and necessary selection device for management purposes,
often operate unreasonably and unnecessarily to the disadvantage of minority
individuals. General intelligence tests commonly used by employers as selection
devices for hiring and promotion deprive minority group members of equal
employment opportunities. Culturally disadvantaged groups—groups which be-
cause of low incomes, substandard housing, poor education, and other "atypical"
environmental experiences—perform less well on these types of tests on the
average than do applicants from middle class environments. The net result is
that members from culturally disadvantaged groups are screened out of em-
ployment and training programs merely because of their failure to score well
on such tests. Such tests are often irrelevant to the job to be performed by the
individual being tested and uncritical reliance on test results may not aid man-
agement decisions and selection of personnel, but will screen out the disadvan-
taged minority individual.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CoNC. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2155. The report indicates the view of the Committee that the proposed amendment
of § 703(h) was fully consistent with the decision of the Court in Griggs and with the guidelines
established by the EEOC. Id. at 22, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2157.
1]7 See 117 CONG. REC. 31,958-85 (Sept. 15, 1971); 117 CONG. REC. 32,088-110 (Sept.
16, 1971). The debate over the relative merits of judicial or administrative enforcement of
Title VII continued in the Senate. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
reported out two bills, Senate Bill 2515, calling for administrative enforcement, with the
recommendation that it pass, S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1971), and House Bill
1746, the bill passed by the House providing for judicial enforcement, with no recommen-
dation, S. REP. No. 416, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1971). After extensive debate and two
unsuccessful cloture motions, 118 CONG. REC. 1972 (Feb. I, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. 2992
(Feb. 3, 1972), the Senate ultimately decided upon judicial enforcement of Title VII, 118
CONG. Rec. 4944-45 (Feb. 22, 1972).
1 " Only two representatives offered comments during the House debate that could be
construed as disapproval of the disparate impact model. Both of those representatives spoke
in opposition to the approval of either version of the bill and cannot be considered to have
articulated the views of the majority. See 117 CONG. REC. 32,101 (Sept. 16, 1971) (statement
of Rep. Ashbrook); 117 CONG. REC. 32,108 (Sept. 16, 1971) (statement of Rep. Rarick).
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of Title VII. The senators divided into three camps on the issue:
those preferring administrative enforcement of the statute, those
preferring judicial enforcement of the statute, and those who pre-
ferred no enforcement of the statute at all. Senators in both of the
first two groups made reference to the Griggs decision and the
theory of discrimination that it adopted in support of their respec-
tive positions ; 139 only members of the third group made disparaging
" In supporting the grant of cease-and-desist powers to the EEOC, Senator Humphrey
stressed the need for the expertise of the EEOC in eliminating employment discrimination:
Our original view that employment discrimination consisted of a series of
isolated incidents has been shattered by evidence which shows that employment
discrimination is, in most instances, the result of deeply ingrained practices and
policies which frequently do not even herald their discriminatory effects on the
surface. The EEOC has stressed many times that much of what we previously
accepted as sound employment policy does, in effect, promote and perpetuate
discriminatory patterns that can be traced hack to the Civil War and earlier.
118 CoNo. REC. 590 (jam 20, 1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator javits stated:
There is a great need for expertise in interpreting and applying the provisions
of title 7 which only a specialized agency can insure. For example, one of the
most critical areas under title 7 is testing of applicants for employment. Whether
or not a given test is appropriate in a given case presents difficult psychological
and sociological issues, as well as difficult problems in the analysis of job content
and personnel policy.
118 Com:. REC. 580-81 (Jan. 20, 1972) (statement of Sen. javits); see also 118 CONG. REC.
3371 (Feb. 9, 1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) (citing Griggs with approval as evidence of
the "multifaceted approach to employment discrimination" of the federal courts).
Several senators who argued against cease-and-desist powers for the EEOC and in favor
of enforcement in the courts also cited Griggs and the disparate impact model in support of
their position. Senator Dominick, the chief spokesman for judicial enforcement, introduced
a newspaper article that made reference to Griggs to explain why judicial enforcement was
preferable to administrative enforcement. That article provided in part:
Pennsylvania's Mr. Anderson contends that the most discriminatory treat-
ment is institutional: subtle practices that leave minorities at a disadvantage
because of cultural and educational differences. He doubts whether such forms
of bias could be rooted out by cease and desist orders. "At the labor board,
individual cases are decided on individual merits," he observes. Thus cease and
desist orders fail to create broad legal principles, and "that's not good enough
for race questions." Mr. Anderson questions, for instance, whether any such
order could ever have had the impact of the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision,
in which the Supreme Court recently held that employment tests, even if fairly
applied, are invalid if they have a discriminatory effect and can't be justified on
the basis of business necessity.
Carlson, "How Best to Toughen the EEOC?," Wall St. j., Sept. 15, 1971, reprinted in 117
Cow. Rec. 41,411-12 (Nov. 16, 1971) (statement of Sen. Dominick).
Senator Spong also argued that the nature of discrimination actionable under the dis-
parate impact model was particularly appropriate for judicial rather than administrative
enforcement:
There can be no question that willful or knowing discrimination in em-
ployment is wrong and 1 believe that it should be dealt with in the most
expeditious way. But the fact is a significant part of the problem today is not
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remarks about that theory or, in one case, seemed to deny that the
theory even existed.' 4°
One other part of the legislative history of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 could conceivably be construed as
congressional disapproval of the disparate impact theory. Senate
Bill 2515, as adopted by the Senate, would have amended section
the simple, willful act of some employer but rather the effect of long-established
practices or systems in which there may be no intent to discriminate or even
knowledge that such is the effect.
I am not suggesting that because it may have been unintentional or un-
knowing, an act of job discrimination should be tolerated. I am saying such
cases ought to be treated differently than other acts of discrimination.
The problem here is not one of simply assigning blame and requiring
remedy but of defining what constitutes a violation of law in the first place and
of constructing a solution which takes account of all the circumstances. I believe
that kind of question should be submitted to the full processes of a court of
law.
118 CONG. REC. 944-45 ( Jan. 24, 1972) (statement of Sen. Spongy.
140
 Senator Allen, a vocal opponent of the bill, twice made reference to the disparate
impact model in urging the defeat of the bill. In connection with the portion of the bill that
would extend Title VII to state and local governments, he made implicit reference to Griggs:
It is true that many State and local job requirements arc in part unrelated to
the job. But it is wholly in keeping with our political traditions to give our State
and local leaders, and our national leaders for that matter, the discretion to
give reasonable weight to factors other than job fitness in filling jobs.
117 Conic. REC. 38402 (Nov. 1, 1972) (statement of Sen. Allen). On the very last day of
debate in the Senate, Senator Allen made another reference to the disparate impact model
in describing the alleged abuses of the EEOC. 118 CONG. REC. 4924-27 (Feb. 22, 1972).
Senator Ervin, in describing his views of the prohibition against discrimination contained in
Title VII and the proposed amendments, seemed to deny that the disparate impact theory
even existed:
I say the entire foundation underlying this bill is unsound. The bill does
nut make illegal the hiring of any person by any employer as such. Under the
terms of this bill and under the terms of every other principle of law, the hiring
of one man by another to perform services for an employer is a perfectly legal
external act. Under the law a man can hire anybody he pleases and under this
bill he can hire anybody he pleases, as long as he does not have some intent
down in the innermost recesses of his mind that accompanies that act. I have a
right, if I ant an employer, even under the Senate bill, to hire anybody I please
as long as I am not moved to hire him because of his race or his religion or
because of his national origin or because of his sex. It is only the intent or the
motive which accompanies the hiring which makes the hiring illegal under this
bill and under the original title VII of the Civil Rights Act or 1964.
118 CONG. REC. 1519 ( Jan. 27, 1971) (statement of Sen. Ervin). Senator Ervin went on to
express his views that discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex was
"entirely natural" and should not be illegal. Id. Senators Allen and Ervin expressed their
disapproval of any version of the bill and eventually voted against the bill. 118 CONG. REC.
4606 (Feb. 18, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. 4907-08, 4944, 4948 (Feb. 22, 1972). They cannot be
considered to have articulated the views of the majority.
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706(g) of Title VII by deleting the requirement for the award of
remedies under the statute that the defendant "intentionally" en-
gage in an unlawful employment practice."' House Bill 1746 as
adopted by the House made no change to this portion of section
706(g)."2 In conference, the House version of the bill prevailed and
the term "intentionally" was left in the statute. No explanation was
given as to the resolution of this difference between the bills either
in the explanation of the conference report or in the limited debate
that occurred before adoption of that report.'" In light of the
generally favorable comments made about the disparate impact
model and the Griggs decision, it seems unlikely that Congress would
have dealt with such an important issue in such an offhanded way.
A review of this legislative history suggests that the members
of Congress in 1972 were aware of the disparate impact theory and
approved of its incorporation into Title VII. The section-by-section
analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 indi-
" 1 S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REC. 4996 (Feb. 22, 1972). Section 706(g)
as enacted by Title VII provided in relevant part that:
U' the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay .
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat.. 241, 261. Senate Bill
2515 would have deleted the word "intentionally" from this portion of § 706(R).
"2 Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746 to Further
Promote Equal Employment Opportunities for American Workers, 118 CoNG. Rite. 6646,
6647 (Mar. 2, 1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Coot: CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2179, 2183.
145 Id.; 118 Corm. REC. 7166-70 (Mar. 6, 1972) (adoption of conference report by
Senate); 118 CONG. Ric. 7563-73 (Mar. 8, 1972) (adoption of conference report by House).
The wording used in the section-by-section analysis of the final bill suggests that this provision
was of little importance to the members of the conference committee. Even though the word
"intentionally" was left in the bill, the analysis of the bill explains this section as follows:
Section 706(0—This subsection is similar to the present section 706(g) of
the Act. It authorizes the court, upon a finding that the respondent has engaged
in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice; to enjoin the respondent
from such'unlawful conduct and order such affirmative relief as may be appro-
priate including, but not limited to, reinstatement or hiring, with or without
hack pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act . . .
Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
118 CONG. REC. 7563, 7565 (Mar. 8, 1972). It appears that the conference committee attached
no significance to the presence of the word "intentionally" in § 706(g).
One of the points mentioned in the House debate on the adoption of the conference
report was that the House had given in to the Senate 18 times, whereas the Senate had given
in to the House only three times. 118 CoNG. REC. 7567 (Mar. 8, 1972). The Senate may have
capitulated on that issue because it was judged to be unimportant.
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cated that: "In any area where the new law does not address itself,
or in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated,
it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts
would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title
VII. "144 Griggs obviously was an important part of the then-present
case law that Congress intended to govern the interpretation of
Title VII.' 45
This implicit ratification of Griggs and the disparate impact
theory is further supported by the fact that Congress, being aware
of the decision in Griggs, did not act to amend Title VII to disap-
prove the disparate impact theory of discrimination. In a number
of other instances, Congress has not hesitated to correct the inter-
pretation given by the Court to civil rights statutes.'" This failure
to amend Title VII provides at least some evidence that the Su-
preme Court had correctly judged Congress's intent in enacting
Title VII.' 47
'" Section-by-Section Analysis of 1-I.R. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 118 CONG. REC. 7563, 7564 (Mar. 8, 1972).
" 5
 The Supreme Court reached precisely this conclusion in Connecticut v. 'real, 457
U.S. 440, 447 n.6 (1982).
145
 For example, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), to overrule legislatively the decision of the Supreme Court
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, in 1988, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 29 (1988),
to overrule legislatively a number of Supreme Court decisions, including Grove City College
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), which had restricted the scope of § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
147 The Supreme Court has previously noted the significance of congressional failure to
act to change the interpretation given by the Court to particular legislation. In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Court noted the
failure of Congress to act after the Court construed Title VII to allow voluntary affirmative
action in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979):
Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor have any
such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our
interpretation was correct . . .. Any belief in the notion of a dialogue between
the judiciary and the legislature must acknowledge that on occasion an invitation
declined is as significant as one accepted.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629-30 n.7.
Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Johnson that congressional inaction should not be read
as congressional approval:
This assumption, which frequently haunts our opinions, should be put to rest.
It is based, to begin with, on the patently false premise that the correctness of
statutory construction is to be measured by what the current Congress desires,
rather than what the law as enacted meant .. . . But even accepting the flawed
premise that the intent of the current Congress ... is determinative, one must
ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw any conclusions re-
garding that intent from the failure to enact legislation. The "complicated check
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A review of the legislative histories of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 confirms the place of the disparate impact theory in Title
VII jurisprudence. Even if the 1964 Congress did not expressly
contemplate or approve the theory, the 1972 Congress recognized
the need for the disparate impact theory and approved of its inclu-
sion in Title VII. Accepting the legitimacy of the disparate impact
theory, however, still leaves unresolved some issues concerning the
proper role of the theory under Title VII and the meaning and
purpose of the theory. An understanding of the purposes of the
disparate impact theory is critical to understanding both the proper
application of that theory and the implications of the recent changes
to the theory by the United States Supreme Court and the proposed
changes by Congress.
II. PURPOSES OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. The "Pure" Disparate Impact Theory: A Challenge to the Effects of
Discriminatory Practices
The "pure" form of the disparate impact theory represents a
method for challenging employer practices that adversely affect
members of minority groups without regard to the intention or
motivation of the employer with respect to those practices. Under
the pure version of the theory, an employer may be held liable for
its actions when it has no intent to disadvantage minorities or even
when its intent with respect to minorities is favorable.
The concept of disparate impact found in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. may not represent the theory in its purest form. Although the
on legislation" erected by our Constitution creates a degree of inertia that makes
it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure
to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to
agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4)
indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.
Id. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Although Justice Scalia is obviously correct in his conclusion that congressional inaction
does not always mean congressional approval, the circumstances in this situation make it
more likely that Congress's failure to overrule Griggs represented approval of that decision.
The express references to Griggs during the debates on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 rule out the possibility that Congress was unaware of the decision in Griggs. The
lack of any suggestion during the debates that Griggs should be overruled discounts the
possibility of inability to agree on how to change the decision. Given the heat of the debate
over the issue of enforcement, and most other issues concerning Title VII, indifference
seems an unlikely alternative. Finally, it would be hard to characterize the efforts of Congress
to obtain effective civil rights legislation as political cowardice.
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Supreme Court in that case upheld the finding of the district court
that the employer had no present discriminatory intent, the chal-
lenged employment policies had a disparate impact on minorities
in part because of the company's history of past intentional discrim-
ination. If the employer had not previously restricted black em-
ployees to the lowest ranking department, the later restrictions on
transfer between departments would not have had as dispropor-
tionate an impact on black employees.t 48 Therefore, the liability of
the employer in that case, although primarily based on the effects
rather than the intent of the employment practice, was not com-
pletely divorced from the presence of discriminatory intent on the
part of the employer.
The Griggs Court stated, however, that the employer's absence
of discriminatory intent, or even the presence of "good intent,"
would not save the employer from liability if the disproportionate
impact of the challenged employment practice could not be justi-
fied.'" Instead, the Court indicated that the employer could escape
liability for the discriminatory effects of its employment practices
only if the employer could.establish that the challenged requirement
measured criteria that were related to job performance. 15° The
language of the Court, and the indication that the employer could
be held liable even if it had no discriminatory intent at all, suggested
that discriminatory intent was entirely irrelevant to the issue of
liability under the disparate impact theory; the only relevant issues
were the impact of the challenged selection criteria on protected
groups and the relationship between the selection criteria and the
job for which the criteria were required.
The 1977 case of Dothard v. Rawlinson, decided by the Supreme
Court several years after Griggs, also suggests the irrelevance of
discriminatory intent to the disparate impact theory, in spite of the
presence of evidence of discriminatory intent in that case.' 51 In
Dothard, the Court considered a challenge under the disparate im-
pact theory to minimum height and weight restrictions that dispro-
portionately excluded women from the position of prison guard.' 52
1" See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
149 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 901 U.S. 424, 932 (1971).
' 5° Id. at 931, 432, 436.
151
 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
152 Id. at 323-24. The defendant in the Doihard case disqualified from consideration for
the position of prison guard persons less than five feet two inches tall or more than six feet
ten inches tall and persons weighing less than 120 pounds or more than 300 pounds. Id. at
329 n.2.
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Nowhere in its discussion of the plaintiff's disparate impact claim
did the Court mention the issue of discriminatory motive or intent
or suggest that there had been any improper purpose in imposing
those restrictions, except to say that the claim did not involve an
issue of purposeful discrimination. 153 Instead, the Court simply
focused on the employer's failure to justify its reliance on height
and weight as necessary for the requirements of the job.' 54
The employer in the Dothard case, however, did intentionally
discriminate against women, at least with respect to other employ-
ment criteria imposed for prison guards. While the plaintiff's dis-
parate impact claim was pending, the employer adopted a regula-
tion establishing same-sex rules for prison guards holding contact
positions in maximum security institutions. 155 Although the Court
ultimately found this discrimination to be permitted as a bona fide
occupational qualification, 156 the employer clearly intended to dis-
criminate against women in the assignment of positions within its
institutions. 157 Although the Court did not rely on this evidence of
discriminatory intent, the facts of the case do not eliminate the
possibility that the Court was influenced by the presence of discrim-
inatory intent in its analysis of the plaintiff's disparate impact claims.
If there is a Supreme Court case that represents an application
of the disparate impact theory in its pure form, that case is Con-
necticut v. Teal,' 58 decided in 1982. In Teal, the plaintiffs challenged
an employer's reliance on a written test as a selection criterion for
promotion, alleging that the test had a disparate impact on blacks. 159
The employer defended on the ground that, although the test may
' 55 Id, at 328. Although the district court did not suggest the existence of any improper
motive in setting the height and weight limits, the court did note that the defendant had
conducted no studies nor consulted any expert on the relevance of these restrictions to the
job of prison guard. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1178 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Although
the employer might have intentionally adopted the minimum height and weight restrictions
in order to disproportionately exclude women, it is not possible to explain the employer's
maximum height and weight restrictions on that ground, because those restrictions presum-
ably would disqualify men predominately. See id, at 1175. Additionally, if the employer
intended to use the minimum height and weight restrictions as a method to exclude women,
the restrictions presumably would have been set much higher to exclude a greater percentage
of women. For example, the employer's minimum height and weight restrictions for the
position of state trooper was five feet nine inches and 160 pounds, which effectively excluded
virtually all women. Id. at 1173, 1178.
154 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32.
155 Id. at 325 & n.6.
'" Id. at 333, 334, .
''" See id. at 344 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mieih, 418 F. Supp. at 1184.
' 58 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
159 Id. at 443-44.
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have excluded blacks disproportionately from consideration for
promotion, the ultimate selection of employees for promotion,
based on a number of other factors, including the operation of an
affirmative action plan, actually resulted in a greater percentage of
black than white employees being selected for promotion.'"
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim under
the disparate impact theory because the test deprived a dispropor-
tionate number of black employees of the equal opportunity to be
considered for promotion, regardless of the percentage of black
employees ultimately selected for promotion.'" The Court con-
cluded that the employer's lack of discriminatory intent, as evi-
denced by its use of an affirmative action plan to benefit black
employees, was not a defense to liability under the disparate impact
theory.' 62 The majority opinion suggested the complete irrelevance
of the presence or absence of discriminatory intent to claims under
the disparate impact theory:
In suggesting that the "bottom line" may be a defense
to a claim of discrimination against an individual em-
ployee, petitioners and amici appear to confuse unlawful
discrimination with discriminatory intent. The Court has
stated that a nondiscriminatory "bottom line" and an em-
ployer's good-faith efforts to achieve a nondiscriminatory
work force, might in some cases assist an employer in
rebutting the inference that particular action had been
intentionally discriminatory . . . But resolution of the
factual question of intent is not what is at issue in this
case.' 63
The position of the majority seems to be that lack of discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the employer is completely irrelevant
to the liability of the employer under the disparate impact theory.
If the majority viewed the disparate impact theory as just a method
to challenge pretextual discrimination, the Court presumably would
have found no liability on the part of the employer in this case,
because there was no evidence of discriminatory intent and, in fact,
the employer had implemented an affirmative action policy to in-
crease the promotion opportunities of minorities. It is therefore
I611 Id, at 444.
161 Id. at 445-51.
162 Id. at 454.
' 6] Id.
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very unlikely that the employer could have been using the chal-
lenged employment test as a pretext for discrimination.'"
B. The Disparate Impact Theory as a Method to Challenge Pretextual
Discrimination
There is some support in the Supreme Court's disparate impact
cases for the position that discriminatory intent is not entirely ir-
relevant to the disparate impact theory. The first indication that
intent might play some role in disparate impact theory was con-
tained in the Court's 1975 decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' 65
decided some four years after Griggs. Although the Court in Moody
disclaimed reliance on the presence of discriminatory intent for
recovery under Title VII,'"" the language used by the Court in
describing the allocation of proof in a disparate impact case sug-
gested the possible relevance of discriminatory intent. Citing to
Griggs and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' 67 a disparate treatment
case decided by the Court two years earlier, the Court indicated
that:
Title VI I forbids the use of employment tests that are
discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets "the
burden of showing that any given requirement [has] .. .
a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining
party or class has made out a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern sig-
nificantly different from that of the pool of applicants. If
an employer does then meet the burden of proving that
its tests are "job related," it remains open to the complain-
ing party to show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also
'r'' A cynic might note that the application of the affirmative action criteria to increase
the percentage of blacks promoted did not occur until a year after the action was brought
and one month before the case was tried. See id. al. 444 (noting when employer implemented
affirmative action program).
j" 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Albemarle case, like Griggs, involved a challenge by black
employees to a testing program implemented by the employer. Id. at 408.
1"" Id. at 422. I n holding that good faith on the part of the employer was not a sufficient
reason for denying back pay, the Court noted: "Title VII is not concerned with the employer's
'good intent or absence of discriminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, nut simply the motivation.'" Id. (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)} (emphasis in original).
1 '17
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and
trustworthy workmanship." Such a showing would be ev-
idence that the employer was using its tests merely as a
"pretext" for discrimination. 168
Two aspects of this passage are troubling to proponents of the
pure form of disparate impact theory. First, the very fact that the
Court cited to the McDonnell Douglas case is troublesome because
that case was a disparate treatment case, in which the liability of the
employer was premised on the motivation behind the challenged
employment practices, not the effects of those practices. 169 Because
the focus in McDonnell Douglas was clearly on discriminatory intent
or motivation, reliance on that case in a disparate impact context
might imply that discriminatory intent was also somehow relevant
to a disparate impact case. Indeed, the Court's reliance on that case
could be taken to mean that the two types of cases were equivalent.
The Albemarle Court's reference to the plaintiff's right to at-
tempt to show "pretext" in order to rebut the employer's proof of
job-relatedness is even more troubling. The McDonnell Douglas
Court's discussion of pretext to which the Albemarle decision refers
168
 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
'" See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). The McDonnell
Douglas case involved a claim by an employee that the employer had refused to rehire him
because of his race and in retaliation for his civil rights activity. The McDonnell Douglas Court
expressly noted the differences between disparate impact claims like that involved in Griggs
and claims of disparate treatment like that involved in McDonnell Douglas:
But Griggs differs from the instant case in important respects. It dealt with
standardized testing devices which, however neutral on their face, operated to
exclude many blacks who were capable of performing effectively in the desired
positions. Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the edu-
cation and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their
control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such
citizens for the remainder of their lives. Respondent, however, appears in
different clothing. He had engaged in a seriously disruptive act against the very
one from whom he now seeks employment. And petitioner does not seek his
exclusion on the basis of a testing device which overstates what is necessary for
competent performance, or through some sweeping disqualification of all those
with any past record of unlawful behavior, however remote, insubstantial, or
unrelated to applicant's personal qualifications as an employee. Petitioner as-
sertedly rejected respondent for unlawful conduct against it and, in the absence
of proof of pretext or discriminatory application of such a reason, this cannot
be thought the kind of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment" which the Court found to be the intention of Congress to remove.
Id. at 806 (citations and footnote omitted).
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is clearly tied up with the concept of intentional discrimination."
Additionally, the notion of purpose or intent is inherent in the
concept of "pretext"; the dictionary definition of "pretext" is "a
purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to
cloak the real intention or state of affairs."rn
The use of the term "pretext" is troublesome because it suggests
that the disparate impact theory, as perceived by the Supreme
Court, may really be about discriminatory intent. The burden im-
posed on the employer to establish the job-relatedness of the chal-
lenged selection criteria may represent a requirement that the em-
ployer establish that it had a nondiscriminatory reason for adopting
the requirement. Such a nondiscriminatory reason would rebut the
inference of discriminatory intent raised by the plaintiff's prima
facie showing of the employer's use of a selection device resulting
in a disparate impact. Similarly, under this view of the theory, the
plaintiff can overcome the employer's justification by showing that
the legitimate reason was not the real reason, but only a "pretext"
for discrimination. This analysis transforms the disparate impact
theory from a method of attacking the effects of discriminatory
practices, without regard to the intent or motivation behind such
17" The Court in McDonnell Douglas described the concept of pretext in this way;
Title VII does not ... permit petitioner to use respondent's conduct as a pretext
for the sort of discrimination prohibited by § 703(0(1). On remand, respondent
must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason
for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext. Especially relevant to such a
showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against peti-
tioner of comparable seriousness to the "stall-in" were nevertheless retained or
rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in
unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to
members of all races.
Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes
facts as to the petitioner's treatment of respondent during his prior term of
employment; petitioner's reaction, if ally, to respondent's legitimate civil rights
activities; and petitioner's general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment .... In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision.
411 U.S. at 804-05 (citations and footnotes omitted)..The evidence that the Court indicates
is relevant to the existence of pretext and the Court's use of the term "coverup" makes it
unmistakably clear that the Court is describing the existence of intentional discrimination.
171 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1797 (unabr. ed, 1986); see also
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 01-"rHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1141 (unabr. ed. 1967) ("that which
is put forward to conceal a true purpose or object; an ostensible reason").
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practices, into a method for challenging pretextual intentional dis-
crimination.
On the other hand, it is possible that the Albemarle Court's use
of the term "pretext" in quotation marks indicates that the Court
was not giving that term its ordinary meaning, and instead was
using it as a shorthand term to describe the plaintiff's rebuttal
burden of demonstrating that less discriminatory means were avail-
able to the employer. This explanation would suggest that, in spite
of the words used by the Court and the ordinary meaning usually
given to those words, the focus of the plaintiff's rebuttal burden is
not to establish that there was in fact a discriminatory motivation
for the employer's selection criteria, but that the criteria were not
really "necessary" because of the availability of alternative means
for accomplishing the legitimate goals of the employer. Therefore,
it is possible to read the Court's decision in the Albemarle case as an
endorsement of the "pure" theory of disparate impact.
The Supreme Court's decision in New York City Transit Authority
v. Beazer, however, also suggests that the focus of the disparate
impact theory and the plaintiff's rebuttal burden is the existence of
pretextual discrimination."' That case involved a challenge to the
employer's policy of refusing to employ individuals who used meth-
adone on the grounds that the policy had a disparate impact on
blacks and other minority groups.'" Although the Court recognized
that the plaintiffs' claims under Title VII were based on the effect
rather than the purpose of the policy,' 74 in holding that the plaintiffs
had not established a case of disparate impact, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs could not overcome the employer's showing of "busi-
ness necessity," indicating that "Whe District Court's express finding
that the rule was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any
claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for discrimination."'"
The Court did not even mention the possibility that the plaintiff
might be able to rebut the employer's showing of job-relatedness
by demonstrating the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.
This failure, particularly in light of the Court's reference to the lack
of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, suggests that
the plaintiff's rebuttal burden of establishing a less discriminatory
alternative is really about discriminatory intent.
172 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
L" Id. at 570, 579. That case also involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the
employer's policy. Id. at 570.
"4 Id. at 584 n.25.
175 Id. at 587.
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Under this interpretation of the plaintiff's rebuttal burden, the
existence of a less discriminatory alternative would not be relevant
to show what it is presumably intended to show—the presence of
discriminatory intent. This seems to be the only explanation for
why the Court would consider the presence of a less discriminatory
alternative irrelevant in light of an express finding of lack of dis-
criminatory intent. I 76
The Supreme Court's disparate impact cases do not clearly
indicate its perception of the purposes of the disparate impact
theory. Some of those cases suggest that the theory is only concerned
with the discriminatory effects of employer practices, and not the
intent or motivation behind such practices. Other cases suggest that
the disparate impact theory is merely a mechanism for challenging
pretextual discrimination and that the effects of employer practices
are relevant only because of the inferential evidence that they pro-
vide of the employer's intent in adopting such practices.
Although the Court had given inconsistent signals as to what it
believed the purpose of the disparate impact theory to be, the Court,
prior to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust and Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, had been consistent with regard to other critical aspects
of the disparate impact theory, such as the allocation of the burdens
of proof with respect to the elements of the theory.'" Both the
Court's allocation of the burdens of proof with respect to these
elements, and recent changes to the burdens of proof, may say as
much about the Court's perceptions of the purposes of the disparate
impact theory as the language used by the Court to describe that
theory.
L" The majority's reliance on the lack of discriminatory intent and its failure to address
the plaintiff 's ability to rebut the showing of job-relatedness by establishing the existence of
a less discriminatory alternative is even more troubling because of the dissent in that case.
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and assented to by Justice Brennan, disputes
the majority's conclusions concerning the plaintiff's prima fade case and the employer's
showing of job-relatedness, and does not even mention the majority's conclusion concerning
the plaintiff's rebuttal burden, suggesting that those members of the Court also approved
of the majority's analysis of this issue. See id. at 601-02 (White, J., dissenting).
The Court's failure to mention the possibility that the plaintiff could rebut the employer's
showing of job-relatedness by establishing a less discriminatory alternative is even more
curious in light of the Court's discussion of alternatives to the exclusion of all methadone
users in the context of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. See id. at 589-93. Consistent
with this portion of the opinion, the Court in its Title VII analysis could have recognized
the plaintiff's ability to rebut the showing of job-relatedness by establishing a less discrimi-
natory alternative and still concluded that no such less discriminatory alternative existed.
'" See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
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III. THE ROLE OF BURDENS OF PROOF IN MEETING THE PURPOSES
OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. Burdens of Production and Burdens of Persuasion
The definition and allocation of the burdens of proof in Title
VII litigation, as in other litigation, is important not only because
of the effect on the outcome of the litigation, but because the
definition and allocation of such burdens give indications as to the
courts' perceptions about particular types of claims. As a result, it
is useful to review the methods by which courts traditionally allocate
such burdens in order to determine the implications of the Supreme
Court's allocation of those burdens under the disparate impact
theory. Additionally, a comparison of the Court's allocation of the
burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases and in disparate
impact cases reveals the Court's perceptions of the relationship
between those two theories.
The term "burden of proof" does not describe a single concept;
two different aspects of the burden of proof are traditionally en-
compassed within that term. The first such concept, usually referred
to as the "burden of production" or the "burden of • producing
evidence," requires that the party on whom the burden is placed
come forward with sufficient evidence to avoid an adverse ruling
against that party at the particular stage of the litigation. 18 The
second concept encompassed within the term "burden of proof" is
the "burden of persuasion," which is the burden placed on a party
to convince the trier of fact of the truth of the facts or claim
asserted; it may properly be thought of as an allocation of the risk
of nonpersuasion.' 79
One commonly speaks of a party as having the burden of proof
on a certain issue without articulating the precise nature of the
particular burden imposed on that party, and it is not uncommon
for a party to have both the burdens of production and persuasion
on a particular issue. These two burdens, however, do operate
independently of one another. Although the burden of production .
may be imposed • initially on one party and shift to another party
"s See McColudicx ON EVIDENCE § 336 at 947 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCoRmicx];
see also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.7 (3d ed. 1985); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 2487 (Chadbourne rev. 1981); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355 (1898).
'" McComicx, MOM note 178, § 336; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 178, § 7.6; J.
THAYER, supra note 178, at 355; J. WicmoRE, supra note 178, § 2485.
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when that burden is met, the burden of persuasion does not "shift"
in this manner. Rather, the burden of persuasion with respect to a
particular issue generally is held to remain on the same party
throughout the litigation.'"
As a general rule, the burden of persuasion with respect to the
essential components of the plaintiff's claim is imposed on the
plaintiff, because the plaintiff is the party seeking relief from the
court. The plaintiff, therefore, should bear the risk of nonpersua-
sion. The burden of production is also initially imposed on the
plaintiff with respect to the elements of the plaintiff's claim for the
same reason. if the court is to invoke its processes to grant relief to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff should have the initial duty to present
proof as to why such relief is appropriate.' 8 ' Once the plaintiff has
produced sufficient evidence to satisfy this burden, referred to as
establishing a "prima facie" case, the burden of production may
then shift to the defendant to meet the evidence of the plaintiff. 182
One way in which the burden of production on a particular
issue may be shifted to the defendant is by the operation of a
presumption.'" A rebuttable presumption operates to create infer-
ences about the existence of a disputed faCt from presented evi-
18" MCCORMICK, Supra note 178, §1 336, 337
" 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 178, § 337.
' 112 Id.; J. THAYER, supra note 178, at 376-77.
I Although there are a number of different legal mechanisms that are called "pre-
sumptions," I mean by the term "presumption" that which is sometimes referred to as a
"rebuttable presumption" of law or fact. See W. WILLS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 43 (2d ed. 1907). Wills describes the term presumption as follows:
The term Presumption denotes an inference of the existence of some fact which
is in question drawn, without evidence, merely from some other fact already
proved or assumed to exist. In our law, following the civil, presumptions are
divided into three kinds: presumptions of fact or natural presumptions, re-
buttable presumptions of law, and conclusive presumptions of law. Presumptions
of law consist of those inferences which have never hardened into rules of law,
and as to which therefore the judge is not entitled to direct the jury that they
are bound as a matter of law to draw theni; in other words, they are common
probabilities of fact which the jury may draw or not, as in their judgment the
circumstances of the case may appear to warrant. Rebuttable presumptions of
law, on the other hand, consist of inferences which, either from their frequent
probability or on some ground of policy, have been adopted by the law, so that
the judge is entitled and bound to direct the jury to draw them, subject to their
being rebutted either by some evidence or by some more powerful presumption
to the contrary. Conclusive presumptions of law are inferences which the law
will not allow to be contradicted by any evidence whatever.
Id.; see also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 178, 7.9 (indicating that only "rebuttable
presumptions of fact," which serve to allocate the burden of production, are properly called
"presumptions").
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dente, such that if contrary evidence to the disputed fact is not
presented, the decisionmaker is required to find in favor of the
party in whose favor the presumption operates. The operation of
a rebuttable presumption therefore results in the imposition of the
burden of production with respect to the disputed issue on the
opposing party.'" The most widely accepted theory concerning the
effect, of presumption on the burden of persuasion is that there is
no effect: a presumption operates to allocate the burden of pro-
duction but has no effect on the allocation of the burden of per-
suasion. 185
Although the burden of persuasion does not shift during the
litigation, for some issues, the burden of persuasion is properly
imposed on the defendant from the outset of the litigation. As
indicated above, the plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of per-
suasion with respect to the essential elements of his or her case.
Although the operation of a presumption may shift the burden of
production to the defendant with respect to an element of the
plaintiff's case, the defendant will not be forced to bear the burden
of persuasion with respect to those elements. Therefore, a defen-
dant may be required to introduce evidence to negate an element
of the plaintiff's prima facie case in order to avoid an adverse ruling,
but the defendant will not be required to persuade the trier of fact
of the nonexistence of the element. On the other hand, if the
defendant introduces evidence designed not to contradict an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's prima facie case but to present additional
facts to avoid the effect of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the
defendant is normally considered to have raised an affirmative
defense for which the defendant bears both the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion.' 86
In order to apply these general rules concerning the allocation
of the burdens of production and persuasion, one still must deter-
mine what properly should be considered an element of the plain-
tiff's case and what should be considered an affirmative defense to
the plaintiff's prima facie case.'" A number of different standards
'ft' W. WILLs, supra note 183, at 43-45; F. JAMES 8c G. HAZARD, supra note 178, § 7.9.
185 MCCORMICK, supra note 178, § 344; J. THAYER, supra note 178, at 380-84; see also
FED. R. EVID. 301.
186 J. THAYER, supra note 178, at 368-70, 379; W. Minis, supra note 183, at 28-29; see
also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 178, §§ 3.9, 4.5, 7.8.
"7 Some commentators suggest that the issue of to whose case a particular element is
essential is the same issue as who should bear the burden of proof; if the burden of proof
is imposed on a particular party with respect to a particular element, then that element is
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have been proposed as a method for allocating the different issues
in a case between the plaintiff's prima facie case and the defendant's
affirmative defenses. Professor Edward Cleary, addressing the tra-
ditional allocation of the burdens of proof, indicated that this allo-
cation can generally be explained by reference to the concepts of
"policy," "fairness," and "probability." 188 He uses the term "policy"
to refer to determinations made by the courts as to which side of
the litigation to favor with respect to particular issues, recognizing
that the allocation of the burdens of proof with respect to particular
issues may work to handicap certain disfavored claims or de-
fenses.' 89 He uses the term "fairness" to suggest that the burdens
of proof with respect to a particular issue are properly placed on
the party who has superior access to the evidence needed to establish
that issue.' 9" The term "probability" suggests that the burdens of
essential to the case of that party. See McCoRmicx, supra note I 78, at 949-50; F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 178, § 7.8; Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay animistic Immaturity,
12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11 (1959). Although that contention is true in a technical sense, I believe
it fairly can be said that some elements of a case are logically a component of the claim that
is being made by the plaintiff and other elements logically belong to the defense that is being
made by the defendant.
'a" Cleary, supra note 187, at II.
Id. at 11-12; see also McCounitcx, supra note 178, § 337. An example of the Supreme
Court's application of the "policy" standard can be found in NLRB v. Transp. Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). In that case, the Court upheld the decision of the Board to treat
the defendant's argument that it should not be liable for discharging an employee for his
union activities because the employee would have been discharged for lawful reasons as an
affirmative defense for which the employer should have the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Id. at 401-04. The Court noted:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared
illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own
wrongdoing.
Id. at 403. The Court gave a similar justification in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775, 1790 (1989), for its placement of a burden of persuasion on the employer in a mixed-
motive disparate treaunent case to demonstrate that the same employment action would have
been taken in the absence of discriminatory motive. See id. at 1797-99 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
I'm Cleary, supra note 187, at 12; see also McCoRmicK, supra note 178, at § 337; F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, supra note 178, § 7.8.
An example of the Supreme Court's reliance on the "fairness" standard can be found
in Gomez v. Toledo, in which the Supreme Court held that the defendant in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 had the burden of pleading with respect to whether the alleged deprivation
of civil rights was protected by qualified immunity because action taken was in good faith.
The Court held that the existence of bad faith was not an element of the plaintiff's claim,
but the existence of good faith was an affirmative defense. 446 U.S. 635, 639-90 (1980).
The Court relied both on the language of the statute and the fact that the evidence relevant
to the determination of the issue was within the control or the defendant. Id. at 639-91.
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proof are often placed on the party who stands to benefit from the
version of the facts less likely to be true, because this allocation will
result in fewer unjust results.' 9 '
The standards traditionally used for allocating burdens of pro-
duction and burdens of persuasion are relevant to the allocation of
those burdens in Title VII cases. By first studying the implication
of the allocation of these burdens in disparate treatment cases, it is
possible to determine the meaning to be given to the Court's allo-
cation of such burdens in disparate impact cases.
B. Allocation of the Burdens of Proof in a Disparate Treatment Case
The Supreme Court has focused a good deal of attention on
the proper allocation of the burden of production and burden of
persuasion with respect to the different elements of a claim under
the disparate treatment theory. The Court's allocation of those bur-
dens of proof, and the implications of such allocation for the mean-
ing of the disparate treatment theory, help to clarify the Court's
current understanding of the nature and meaning of the disparate
impact theory.
The Court first addressed the allocation of the burdens of proof
in a claim of disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.' 92
 In that case, the Court discussed the burdens imposed on
each party with respect to the proof required to establish intentional
Although this case expressly dealt with the burden of pleading rather than the burden of
proof, see id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), the burden of proof with respect to a
particular issue is normally placed on the same party as is the burden of pleading, and similar
standards are used with respect to the allocation of both types of burdens. See F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 178, § 4.5.
°' See Cleary, supra note 187, at 13-15; see also McConmicn, supra note 178, 337. The
Court has also used the "probability" standard in allocating the burdens of proof. In Teamsters
v. United States, the Court recognized the role of probabilities in the allocation of the burden
of proof. In holding that employers in pattern and practice cases have the burden of proving
that individual members of the class were not the victims of discrimination after the plaintiffs
establish a prima facie case, the Court noted:
Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial
evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the
proof .... Although the prima facie case did not conclusively demonstrate that
all of the employer's decisions were part of' the proved discriminatory pattern
and practice, it did create a greater likelihood that any single decision was a
component of the overall pattern.
431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1799
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing that the imposition of the burden of proof
on the employer in the Teamsters case was based on "the likelihood that an illegitimate criterion
was a factor in the individual employment decision").
194
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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discrimination,'" indicating that the plaintiff is first required to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open, and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.' 94
Once.a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the "burden must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection."'" Finally, if the employer
discharges its "burden of proof" and "meet[s]" the plaintiff's prima
facie case, the plaintiff must be given the opportunity to "show"
that the employer's stated reason for the plaintiff's rejection was
pretextual and that the "presumptively valid reasons for his rejec-
tion were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory reason."'"
Although the Supreme Court set forth the allocation of the
burdens of proof in a disparate treatment case in McDonnell Douglas,
the Court did not explain fully the implications of its allocation of
the burdens of proof until its decision almost eight years later in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.' 97 This time the
193 Id. at 802. Although the Court did not expressly say that this allocation of the
burdens of proof applied only to disparate treatment claims and not claims of disparate
impact, the Court did note the different character of those claims and the different type of
proof involved in proving those claims. See id. at 802 n.14, 805-06.
1 Y4 Id. at 802. The Court noted that the particular requirements of the plaintiff's prima
facie case would depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. Id. at 802 n.13.
1ij5 Id. at 802.
Id at 804, 805. A comparison of the language used by the Court in McDonnell Douglas
with that used by the Court in the disparate impact cases to describe the allocations of the
burdens of proof is instructive. See infra note 220-21 and accompanying text. The McDonnell
Douglas Court indicated that the plaintiff had the burden to "show" the elements of the
prima facie case and to "show" or "demonstrate" pretext; the defendant had only the burden
to "articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id, at 802; see also id. at 803, 804.
'"7 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The Supreme Court's two intervening cases, Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), and Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24
(1978), did little to clear up confusion in the lower courts spawned by McDonnell Douglas. In
Furnco, the Court referred to the burden imposed on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case as the burden "of proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race," 438 U.S. at 577, and as a
burden to "articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 578. The Court also
referred to the plaintiff's burden with respect to pretext as an opportunity to "introduce
evidence." Id.
The Court's opinion in Sweeney also was not a model of clarity:
While words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove," may have more or
less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they arc used, we
think that there is a significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing] some
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Court expressly noted that its allocation of the burdens of proof
applied only to disparate treatment, not disparate impact, cases.' 98
. In addressing the burden imposed on the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court confirmed that this
burden was a burden of persuasion and that the purpose of the
prima facie case was to create an inference of intentional discrimi-
nation by eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's rejection. The Court made clear that the prima
facie case created a "legally, mandatory rebuttable presumption,"
requiring the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff if the em-
ployer did not rebut the presumption.' 99
The Court next addressed the nature of the burden imposed
on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrim-
ination. The Court noted that the burden placed on the defendant
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action
with respect to the plaintiff was not a burden of persuasion, noting
that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff." 20° Instead, the Court held that the
burden placed on the defendant was merely to produce evidence
to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case and therefore "allow the
trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision
had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.''201
Once the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the
plaintiff has the opportunity to show pretext, "to show that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "proviing] absence of discriminatory
motive." By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, we made it clear that the former will suffice to
meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination.
439 U.S. at 25. To further confuse the issue, four members of the Court dissented in part
on the grounds that there was no difference between the requirement of "articulating" and
"proving" a legitimate motivation for the challenged employment decision. The dissenters
suggested that the Court's prior decisions made "perfectly clear" that the defendant's burden
to rebut the prima facie case was only a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion.
Id. at 28, 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I" Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252, 255 n.8 (1981).
'" Id. at 253-54 & tO. The Court's characterization of the plaintiff's burden of estab-
lishing the prima facie case as a burden of persuasion is somewhat curious, in light of the
fact that the intermediate burden of establishing a prima facie case usually is considered to
be only a burden of production, with the burden of persuasion not imposed until the end
of the case. See MCCORMICK, supra note 178, 336. In any event, even if the prima facie case
does impose a burden of persuasion at that point of the litigation, the burden is only to
establish the facts that create the inference of intentional discrimination, not to prove the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
"' Id. at 254-55, 257.
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proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment de-
cision."2°2 The Court noted that the plaintiff could show pretext
either directly by convincing the trier of fact that a discriminatory
reason motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
reason given by the employer was not credible. The Court indicated
that the plaintiff's burden to show pretext was a burden of persua-
sion, and that the burden of showing pretext merged with the
plaintiff's "ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has
been the victim of intentional discrimination." 2"
Although some commentators have criticized the Court's allo-
cation of the burdens of proof in claims of disparate treatment on
the ground that it imposes too light a burden on the defendant to
rebut the inference of discrimination created by the prima facie
case,204 the Court's allocation of these burdens of proof is consistent
with the general rules concerning burdens of proof and the pur-
poses of the disparate treatment theory. The disparate treatment
theory is wholly concerned with the existence of intentional discrim-
ination, and each of the steps in the allocation of the burdens of
proof with respect to that theory is aimed at determining the exis-
tence of intentional discrimination. 2" Accordingly, the ultimate is-
sue in a case of disparate treatment is whether the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff. As the party seeking
relief, the plaintiff should have the burden of persuasion on this
ultimate issue.
Although Title VII is silent on burdens of proof, one reference
in Title VI I's legislative history supports placing the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion on the plaintiff with respect to the existence of
intentional discrimination. The Case-Clark Interpretative Memo-
randum, in discussing the enforcement procedures under the stat-
ute, indicates that:
The suit against the respondent, whether brought by
the Commission or by the complaining party, would pro-
ceed in the usual manner for litigation in the Federal
courts . . . The respondent, not the defendant, would
have a full opportunity to make his defense, and the plain-
202 Id. at 256.
2°3 Id. at 253, 256.
2" See Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1267-71 (1981).
405 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 255 n.8.
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tiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving
that discrimination had occurred. 206
In order to prove that discrimination has occurred under the dis-
parate treatment theory, the plaintiff must establish the existence
of intentional discrimination, either directly or inferentially.
The general standards relied upon for allocating the different
issues in an action between the plaintiff's case and the defendant's
defense also support placing the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff to establish the existence of intentional discrimina-
tion.207
 As a matter of "probability," it would presumably be im-
proper to assume that the fact of presence of intentional discrimi-
nation is more likely to be true than the fact of no discrimination.
As a matter of "policy," whether or not discrimination claims are
considered to be disfavored claims,208
 it would be difficult to justify
requiring an employer to prove that it did not engage in intentional
discrimination, in spite of the employer's greater access to evidence
of its own intent. Because intentional discrimination is the issue
central to liability under the disparate treatment theory, placing the
ultimate burden on the defendant with respect to the existence of
intentional discrimination would relieve the plaintiff of the burden
of proving its right to recover and would be inconsistent with the
traditional principles under which burdens of proof are allocated.
The plaintiff's prima facie case creates an inference or pre-
sumption of intentional discrimination sufficient to shift the burden
of production to the defendant. The evidence presented by the
defendant concerning the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its action serves to negate this inference of discrimination by sug-
gesting that the defendant took the challenged action for legitimate,
not discriminatory, reasons. The plaintiff's evidence of pretext in-
dicates that, in spite of the legitimate reason offered by the defen-
dant, the employer's action was in fact based on an intent to dis-
criminate, either because of a showing of the true reasons for the
employment action or the lack of credibility of the proffered reason.
Because the defendant in a disparate treatment case who asserts
that there are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employ-
ment action simply is trying to negate an essential element of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, rather than raising a new issue in an
2°6 1I0 CONG. REC. 7214 (Apr. 8, 1964).
207 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
2°' See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920,925-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibson,
J., dissenting) (discussing the courts' attitude toward and treatment of civil rights).
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attempt to avoid the operation of the finding of intentional discrim-
ination, the defendant has not raised an affirmative defense for
which it should bear the burden of persuasion. 209 In contrast, when
the defendant does raise a claim in the nature of an affirmative
defense to a claim of disparate treatment, such as a bona fide
occupational qualification under section 703(0, 21 ° the burden of
persuasion is properly imposed on the defendant. 2 " When the
defendant seeks to rely on a bona fide occupational qualification,
the defendant is not denying that it engaged in intentional discrim-
ination; it is not articulating a "nondiscriminatory" reason to explain
why its actions, which appear discriminatory, are in fact not discrim-
inatory. Instead, the defendant 'is conceding that its actions do
constitute discrimination—different treatment of protected groups
based on a prohibited characteristic—but that its discrimination
against a protected group is justified by the demands of its business.
Therefore, the defendant is not seeking to negate an element of
the plaintiff's claim, that of intentional discrimination, but is raising
additional facts in an effort to avoid the effects of that showing of
intentional discrimination.
C. Allocation of the Burdens of Proof in a Disparate Impact Case
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not been as explicit in
explaining its allocation of the burdens of proof for a disparate
impact claim as it has been for disparate treatment claims. Although
the Court discussed the allocation of the burdens of proof for
disparate impact claims in a number of opinions, it did not articulate
clearly whether it was imposing a burden of production or a burden
of persuasion with respect to particular elements of claims and
defenses under that theory.
The Court in Griggs gave relatively little attention to the allo-
cation of the burdens of proof with respect to the theory of discrim-
ination that it was articulating. The Court did not focus at all on
t" See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
2L" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
Yet
	 Court's language in Dothard v. Rawlinson, characterizing the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (bfoq) defense as "the narrowest of exceptions to the general rule requir-
ing equality of employment opportunities," suggests that it is an affirmative defense that the
employer has to "prove." 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775, 1789 (1989) (indicating the Court's assumption that the employer must
"show" the existence of the bfoq defense and that the employer has the "burden of justifying
its ultimate decision"); id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (also recognizing appropriateness
of imposing burden on employer to justify existence of bfoq).
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the showing the plaintiff had to make to establish a violation of
Title VII, simply indicating that "on the record in the present case,
`whites register far better on the Company's alternative require-
ments than Negroes.'" 212
 The Court was somewhat more specific
concerning the burden that it was placing on the defendant with
respect to the business necessity or job-relatedness of the challenged
practice or criteria: the Court said that the employer has the "bur-
den of showing that any given requirement {has] a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question." 213
Although the Court in Albemarle dealt with the allocation of the
burdens of proof in a disparate impact case only in passing,2 ' 4 it
built upon Griggs by adding a third step to the process. The Court
indicated that, first, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that the challenged practice has a signif-
icantly disproportionate impact on minorities. Next, the employer
has the burden of' "proving" job-relatedness. Finally, the plaintiff
must be given the opportunity to "show" that other tests or devices
would serve the purposes of the employer without an adverse im-
pact on minorities. 2 i 5
The Court confirmed this allocation of burdens of proof in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 216 New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 217 and
Connecticut v. Teal. 218 Although the Court used several different
terms to describe the nature of the burden being imposed, such as
"show," "prove," "demonstrate," and "establish," the Court seemed
to use those terms interchangeably. There was no suggestion in
these opinions that those terms did not all have equivalent mean-
ings. 219
2 ' 2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1239 n.6 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
2" Id. at 431, 432.
Yll See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
215
2 " 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
217
 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979).
212 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982).
219 In Griggs, the Court indicated that the employer had the burden of "showing"
business necessity. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The Albemarle Court said that the plaintiff has
to "shown" disproportionate impact, that the employer has to "prov[el" job relatedness, and
that the plaintiff can then "show" less discriminatory alternatives. 422 U.S. at 425. The
Dothard Court said that the plaintiff must "show" a prima facie case of discrimination, the
employer must "proven" job-relatedness, and the plaintiff must "show" the existence of other
selection devices. 433 U.S. at 329. The Court in Beazer required the plaintiff to "establish" a
prima facie case and referred to the employer's "demonstration" of job-relatedness. 440 U.S.
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This language should be contrasted with the language used by
the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to describe the burden
of production imposed on the employer in a disparate treatment
case to rebut the plaintiff's inference of discrimination created by
the prima facie case: "The burden then must shift to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection. "220 It would seem that the burden to "articulate"
a reason is much less onerous than the burden to "show," "dem-
onstrate," or "prove" an element of the case. Therefore, a natural
reading of these cases would be that the burden of proof imposed
on the parties by the Court in the disparate impact cases is the more
rigorous burden of persuasion regarding those respective ele-
ments.22 '
This is precisely the way that the Court's language was inter-
preted by the majority of the lower courts in the almost two decades
between the Court's decision in Griggs and its decisions in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank Trust and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. In
contrast to the confusion that had reigned before the Court's de-
cision in Burdine with respect to the proper allocation of the burdens
of proof in disparate treatment cases, 222
 there seemed to be little
at 584, 587. The Court in Teal required the plaintiff to "show" a significantly discriminatory
impact to "establish" a prima facie case, indicated that the employer must "demonstrate" job-
relatedness, and imposed the burden on the plaintiff to "show" pretext in rebuttal, 457 U.S.
at 446-47.
225
	 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (emphasis added).
221
 The Court seems to have taken the position that there is a difference between the
terms "articulate" and "prove" with respect to the burden of proof imposed by those terms.
The Court in Board of Trustees v. Sweeney vacated and remanded a case for reconsideration
because of the lower court's apparent equating of the terms "articulate" and "prove," indi-
cating chat there was a significant distinction between those terms. 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978);
we supra note 197, On the other hand, the Court has, in another context, indicated that the
terms "show" and "prove" may not be equivalent terms. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Court
suggested that the burden described by the word "show" might be even lighter than the
burden described by the word "articulate." 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In that case, the Court
indicated that the burden imposed on a party moving for summary judgment to "show" an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact did not even impose a burden of producing
evidence on that party; all the party was required to do was to "point[] out to the district
court" the absence of evidence on the part of the opposing party. Id. Conversely, the dissent
in that case suggested that the burden imposed on the party moving for summary judgment
was both an initial burden of production and an ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 330
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The language used by the concurring opinion in Dothard does suggest the possibility of
a lighter burden imposed on the employer in a disparate impact case with respect to business
necessity. Justice Rehnquist, citing to McDonnell Douglas, indicated that the burden imposed
on the defendant was to "articulate the asserted job-related reasons" for the challenged
practice. Dolhard, 433 U.S. at 340 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
222 Compare Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 657-59 (8th Cir. 1980)
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dispute among the lower courts, at least in recent years, concerning
the proper allocation of the burdens of proof in disparate impact
cases. 223 The Court, however, went out of its way in Watson and
Wards Cove to redefine the allocation of the burdens of proof in
disparate impact cases. In neither Watson nor Wards Cove was the
discussion of the allocation of the burdens of proof strictly necessary
to the Court's decision of the issues before it.
The issue in Watson was whether subjective employment prac-
tices could be challenged under the disparate impact theory. The
lower courts had held that the disparate impact theory was inappl-
icable to the plaintiff's challenge to the employer's practice of re-
lying on the subjective judgments of its supervisors in making pro-
motion decisions. 224 After a majority of the Court concluded that
the disparate impact theory could be used to challenge both subjec-
tive and objective employment practices, four Justices went on to
discuss the proper allocation of the burdens of proof in cases chal-
lenging subjective employment practices under the disparate impact
theory. 225
(although the plaintiff bears ultimate burden of persuasion, the defendant has a burden of
producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the burden of "showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason exists factually") with Loeb v.
Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979) (burden imposed on the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is only a burden of production, not a burden
of persuasion) with Burdine v. Texas Dept of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th
Cir. 1979) (defendant required to prove nondiscriminatory reasons for decision by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence).
223 See, e.g., Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 393 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendant has burden
of persuasion on issue of business necessity in disparate impact case); Lewis v. Bloomsburg
Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 572 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ.,
766 F.2d 917, 928 (6th Cir. 1985), and No. 84-5949 (6th Cir. 1985) (unpublished opinion)
(same); Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 763 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (11th Cir. 1985)
(same); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985) (same); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983) (same).
The court reached a contrary result in Croker v. Boeing Co., in which the court of appeals
concluded that the defendant had only a burden of production to rebut the "inference of
discrimination" created by the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact. 662 F.2d 975,
991 (3d Cir. 1981). In other cases, the courts did not clearly articulate whether the "burden
of proof" imposed on the defendant to show business necessity was a burden of production
or a burden of persuasion, but the courts seem to be imposing a heavy burden on the
defendant to justify its practices. See Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 15'24 (3d Cir. 1988)
(difficult burden imposed on employer to defend its hiring practices justified by employer's
better access to information); Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir.
1987) (heavier burden of proof imposed on defendant in a disparate impact case than a
disparate treatment case).
224 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 984 (1988).
221 Id. at 989-99; id. at 999-1011, 1001 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). It is not entirely clear from a reading
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Although the plurality never explicitly recognized that they
were revising the existing allocations of the burdens of proof in
disparate impact cases:226 the definition and allocations of the bur-
dens of proof by the plurality differed substantially from the stan-
dards set forth in Griggs and its progeny. In describing the plaintiff 's
burden of establishing a prima facie case, the plurality indicated
that the plaintiff not only had to identify the specific employment
practice being challenged, but had to prove by reliable statistical
evidence that the particular practice caused the exclusion of minor-
ity group members because of their membership in a protected
group. 227 Although this is a much more stringent standard than
that previously applied in the Court's disparate impact cases, the
plurality's allocation of the burdens of proof with respect to "busi-
ness necessity" was an even greater deviation from the Court's
previous cases.
Although recognizing the language of Griggs that placed the
burden on the employer to "show" the job-relatedness of the chal-
lenged criteria, the plurality argued that this language should not
be interpreted to impose a burden of persuasion on the employer
with respect to this defense. 228 Instead, the plurality indicated that
the only burden imposed on the employer was a "burden of pro-
ducing evidence that its employment practices are based on legiti-
mate business reasons: the ultimate burden of proving that discrim-
ination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." 229
Finally, the plurality addressed the plaintiff's rebuttal burden
of showing the availability of other selection devices without a dis-
of the opinion whether the plurality intended the articulated evidentiary standards to apply
only to disparate impact cases involving subjective practices or to all disparate impact cases.
See id. at 994 & n.2.
226 justice O'Connor dismissed the prior disparate impact cases with the following
explanation for what she referred to as "a fresh and somewhat closer examination of the
constraints that operate to keep 'the disparate impact) analysis within its proper bounds":
Both concurrences agree that we should, for the first time, approve the use
of disparate impact analysis in evaluating subjective selection practices. Unlike
Justice Stevens, we believe that this step requires us to provide the lower courts
with appropriate evidentiary guidelines, as we have previously done for dispar-
ate treatment cases. Moreover, we do not believe that each verbal formulation
used in prior opinions to describe the evidentiary standards in disparate impact
cases is automatically applicable in light of today's decision.
Id. at 994 & n.2.
227 Id, at 994-96.
22H Id, at 998.
229 Id. at 997-98.
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parate impact. The plurality suggested that the plaintiff must es-
tablish not only the availability of other selection devices but that
the alternatives were equally effective as the challenged practice, in
terms of costs and other burdens imposed on the employer. The
plurality indicated that these factors would be relevant to the issue
of whether the "challenged practice has operated as the functional
equivalent of a pretext for discrimination."23°
The plurality's changes to the evidentiary standards for dispar-
ate impact cases were not lost on the concurrence, who indicated
that the plurality's allocation of the burdens of proof was "flatly
contradicted" by the Court's previous cases."' The concurrence was
particularly concerned with the plurality's characterization of the
employer's burden with respect to business necessity as a burden of
production, rather than as a burden of persuasion. The concur-
rence noted that the plurality's allocation of the burdens of proof
more closely resembled the Court's disparate treatment cases than
its disparate impact cases. 232
The concurrence was concerned that the plurality had failed
to recognize the critical differences between the two theories of
discrimination. 233 The concurrence argued that it was appropriate
to impose only a burden of production on an employer with respect
to a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in a disparate treatment
case because the plaintiff's prima facie case raises only an inference
of intentional discrimination, not proof of a Title VII violation. 234
In contrast, the concurrence noted that the plaintiff's prima facie
case in a disparate impact case does not establish only an inference
of discrimination, but proves a violation of Title VII: the dispro-
portionate impact of an employment practice on members of a
minority group constitutes a violation of Title VII unless the em-
ployer can prove that the effect of that practice is justified. 235 Ac-
cordingly, the concurrence argued that it is appropriate to impose
2" Id.
23 Id. at 1000-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
232 Id. at 1000-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The plurality's blurring
of the methods of proof for disparate treatment and disparate impact claims is particularly
ironic in light of the concern expressed by some of the same members of the Court dissenting
in Connecticut v. Teal that it was the majority in that case that was confusing the two theories
of discrimination. See 457 U.S. 440,456-64 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
233
 Watson, 487 U.S. at 1002 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
234
 Id. at 1003-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
233 Id, at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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a burden of persuasion on the employer with respect to its justifi-
cation for a practice that would otherwise violate the statute. 23"
The Watson plurality's allocation of the burdens of proof for
disparate impact cases became the position of the majority of the
Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio." 7 As was the case in
Watson, the Court's discussion of the allocation of the burdens of
proof was not strictly necessary to the issue before the Court. In-
stead, the Court reached out to make the position of the plurality
in Watson a majority decision. 238 This seems to indicate some eager-
ness on the part of the majority to reformulate, and thereby weaken,
the disparate impact theory.
The plaintiffs in Wards Cove challenged a number of employ-
ment practices of the defendant under the disparate impact theory,
alleging that those practices had resulted in a racially stratified
workforce, in which white employees filled the higher paid "non-
cannery" jobs and nonwhite employees filled the lower paid "can-
nery" jobs.23° The principal issue before the Court was whether the
statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs concerning the rela-
tive percentages of white and nonwhite employees in the two clas-
sifications of jobs established a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact. 24° After concluding that the plaintiffs had not established a
prima facie case, the Court then discussed the evidentiary standards
that would apply if the plaintiff did establish a prima facie case. 24 '
The majority . in Wards Cove wholly adopted the evidentiary
standards set forth by the Watson plurality with respect to the stan-
dards for the plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer's burden
with respect to the issue of business necessity, and the plaintiff's
burden to demonstrate the existence of less discriminatory alter-
natives to the challenged practice. 242 In discussing the issue of
2" Id. at 1006-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The concurrence was
also concerned that the plurality's acceptance of evidence by the employer that the challenged
employment practices were based on "legitimate business reasons" would allow practices that
were not related to the requirements of the particular job or necessary to the needs of the
business, as required by prior cases. Id. at 1005-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
2"7
	 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
2" See id. at 2124; id. at 2127 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
2"'
	 at 2119-20.
210 Id. at 2121.
air Id. at 2121-25.
212 Id. at 2124-27.
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whether the disproportionate impact shown by the plaintiff's prima
facie case could be justified, the Court defined the inquiry as follows:
Though we have phrased the query differently in
different cases, it is generally well-established that at the
justification stage of such a disparate impact case, the
dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves,
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer. The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned
review of the employer's justification for his use of the
challenged practice. A mere insubstantial justification in
this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard
of review would permit discrimination to be practiced
through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employ-
ment practices. At the same time, though, there is no
requirement that the challenged practice be "essential" or
"indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass
muster . . . . 245
The Court made clear that the ultimate burden of persuasion for
the issue of "business necessity" was on the plaintiff, while the
defendant carried only a burden of production to justify its em-
ployment practice. 244 The Court claimed that this allocation of the
burdens of proof was consistent with the "usual method for allo-
cating persuasion and production burdens in the federal court" and
indicated that this allocation was consistent with its allocation of the
burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases. 245
The dissent in Wards Cove viewed the majority opinion as a
retreat from the goal of Title VII to eliminate barriers to equal
employment opportunity and a retreat from the disparate impact
theory.246 The dissent argued that the majority was incorrect in
imposing only a burden of production on the defendant with re-
spect to "business necessity," indicating that this justification was in
the nature of an affirmative defense for which the burden of per-
suasion should be imposed on the employer. 247
If the disparate impact theory is really a means for challenging
the effects of employment practices without regard to the intent or
243 Id. at 2125-26.
2" Id. at 2126.
2" Id. The Court noted, somewhat understating the case, that this allocation might not
be consistent with its prior cases: "We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be
read as suggesting otherwise." Id.
246 Id. at 2127-28,2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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absence of intent behind the challenged practice, the dissent in
Wards Cove is correct in characterizing the justification of business
necessity as an affirmative defense for which both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion are properly imposed on
the defendant. 248 Under this "pure" view of the disparate impact
theory, the essence of the plaintiff's case is the disproportionate
effect of the employer's practice on members of protected groups.
It is appropriate, of course, to impose the initial burden of
production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the plaintiff
to establish that the challenged policy in fact does have the prohib-
ited discriminatory effect: a plaintiff should not be able to recover
without proving this basic element of his or her case. 249 Because the
central issue in a "pure" disparate impact claim is the discriminatory
impact of the challenged employment practice, considerations of
"policy" require the plaintiff to bear the burden of establishing the
discriminatory impact of the employment practice that it is chal-
lenging. 25° The employer should not be required to bear the burden
of disproving the assertion of the plaintiff that its employment
policies have a discriminatory effect on certain protected groups.
Additionally, the legislative history of Title VII, which suggests that
the plaintiff should have the burden of proving discrimination, 2"
supports the placement of the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the plaintiff with respect to the issue of whether the policy has a
disproportionate impact on minority group members because, un-
der this view of the disparate impact theory, it is that impact that
constitutes the prohibited discrimination.
Under the pure view of the disparate impact theory, when a
defendant presents evidence seeking to establish that there is in fact
no disproportionate impact on members of protected groups or
that the challenged practice is not the cause of any such dispropor-
tionate impact, the defendant is merely seeking to negate an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact. in this
situation, it is entirely appropriate to impose only a burden of
production on the defendant with respect to that issue, because the
plaintiff should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect
to whether the challenged policy has a disproportionate impact. 252
440 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
25° See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, when the defendant raises the defense of
"business necessity," or, as described by the Court in Wards Cove,
the defense of a "legitimate business justification," 255 the defendant
is not attempting to negate the plaintiff's claim that the challenged
practice has a discriminatory effect. Instead, the defendant is raising
new facts in an effort to avoid the effect of the plaintiff's prima
facie showing of disparate impact. The defendant is arguing that,
in spite of the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice, the
practice is still justified because the practice is related to the needs
and goals of the employer's business. This is the essence of an
affirmative defense because it seeks to avoid, rather than deny, an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 254
The defense of "business necessity" or "legitimate business jus-
tification" most closely resembles the bona fide occupational quali-
fication (bfoq) defense to a claim of disparate treatment. Under the
bfoq defense, an employer can rely on the sex, religion, or national
origin of an employee if "reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of [the] particular business or enterprise."255 In both situa-
tions, the defendant is not trying to negate the plaintiff's showing
of discrimination, but rather is attempting to avoid the effect of
what would ordinarily constitute a violation of Title VII by arguing
that its discriminatory activity is "necessary" in some sense. In both
situations, the defendant is employing a defense that is in the nature
of a traditional affirmative defense. The employer bears the burden
of persuasion with respect to the bfoq defense to a disparate treat-
ment claim;256 the defendant should also bear the burden of per-
suasion with respect to the issue of "business necessity" under the
disparate impact theory.
Professor Cleary's considerations also support imposing on the
defendant the burden of persuasion regarding the element of busi-
ness necessity. Notions of "fairness" support placing the burden of
persuasion for this element on the defendant, who obviously has
better access to the evidence necessary to establish the needs of its
business than does the plaintiff. 257 As a matter of "policy," if the
underlying basis for the disparate impact theory is the "equal op-
portunity" concept of equality, 258 the harm to that notion of equality
252
 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
454 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
255
 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-2(e) (1988).
256 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
256 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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would be caused by the disproportionate impact of a challenged
practice itself, without regard to its justification; the justification for
a practice would only be relevant to determining if the impact would
be allowed because of the needs of the employer's business.
Therefore, if the disparate impact theory is being applied in
its pure form, in which employer practices are unlawful solely be-
cause of their effects and the intent behind the employer practice
is irrelevant, the Supreme Court is incorrect in imposing only a
burden of production on the defendant with respect to this defense.
The Court is also incorrect when it asserts that its rule "conforms
with the usual method of allocating persuasion and production
burdens in the federal courts." 259
There are, however, two possible explanations for the Court's
allocation of the burdens of proof in the manner that it did in
Watson and Wards Cove, other than an assumption that the Court
has misconceived the fundamental principles concerning burdens
of proof. The first possibility is that the Court considers the essence
of the plaintiff's showing of disparate impact to be not only the
existence of an employment practice with a disproportionate impact
on protected groups, but the existence of such a practice with an
unjustified effect; that is, one not supported by "business necessity."
If the plaintiff were required at the outset of his or her case to
259 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonic), 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). The Court's citation
to Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in support of its assertion about the proper
allocation of the burden of persuasion is not persuasive: Rule 301 provides as follows:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shirt to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. Erin). 301. Rule 301 deals only with the effect of presumptions on the shifting of
burdens of production and persuasion; it does not speak to the allocation of the burden of
persuasion as to certain issues from the outset of the litigation. See supra notes 183-86 and
accompanying text.
A unanimous Supreme Court earlier rejected precisely the contention made by the Wards
Cove Court concerning the effect of Rule 301 on the allocation or the burden of persuasion.
In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., the Court rejected the argument that Rule 301
prevented the imposition of a burden of persuasion on the defendant with respect to an
affirmative defense;
Respondent contends that Federal Rule of Evidence 301 requires that the
burden of persuasion rest on the General Counsel .... The Rule merely defines
the term "presumption." It in no way restricts the authority of a court or an
agency to change the customary burden of persuasion in a manner that oth-
erwise would be permissible.
462 U.S. 393, 403-04 n.7 (1983).
78	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:1
establish both that the challenged practice has a disproportionate
impact and that the impact is not justified, then the defendant's
defense of "business necessity" or "legitimate business justification"
would not be an affirmative defense, but would only constitute a
negation of an element of the plaintiff's prima facie showing of
unjustified impact. Under this interpretation of the disparate impact
theory, the defendant would properly bear only a burden of pro-
duction, not of persuasion. 26° If this is the Court's view of the
plaintiff's burden in a disparate impact case, its allocation of the
burdens of proof would be correct.
This explanation for the Court's allocation of the burden of
proof finds some support in the Court's recent treatment of the
seniority system exception in section 703(h). 26 ' In Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., the Court rejected the argument that section
703(h) constituted an affirmative defense to a claim of disparate
impact; rather, the Court stated that this section made intentional
discrimination an element of any Title VII challenge to a seniority
system.262 It is entirely possible that the Court would read the pro-
vision on professionally developed ability tests in section 703(h) in
the same manner; that is, as a requirement that a plaintiff establish
the non-job-relatedness of the challenged tests as part of the prima
facie case, rather than requiring the defendant, as an affirmative
defense, to show the job-relatedness of the challenged test. By anal-
ogy, the Court might also have chosen to treat the issue of "business
necessity" as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, rather
than as an affirmative defense to a claim of disparate impact not
specifically covered by section 703(h).
Although this version of the Court's view of the disparate im-
pact theory is a plausible one, it is not supported by the language
used by the Court in describing that theory. Nowhere in its descrip-
tion of the plaintiff's prima facie showing in a disparate impact case
does the Court suggest that the plaintiff has to show initially that
the impact of the challenged practice is not justified by business
26° See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
26 ' That section provides in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority.., system, ... provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
462 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2267 (1989).
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necessity. In describing the plaintiff's prima facie .case in Watson
and Wards Cove, the Court noted that the plaintiff had to identify
the particular employment practice being challenged and had to
establish that the practice was causing the disparity in the employer's
workforce. 2" The plaintiff's required showing for its prima facie
case raises no inference that the disparity is not justified, sufficient
to shift the burden of production to the defendant to justify the
employer's challenged practice. It is difficult to see how the Court
can consider this lack of justification for the employment practice
to be an essential element of the plaintiff's case if the plaintiff can
prevail without showing that element, which would occur in the
situation in which the defendant did not meet its burden of pro-
duction regarding "business necessity." 264 If this explanation is the
justification for the Court's reallocation of the burdens of proof,
the Court's language in Watson and Wards Cove does not suggest
that this is what the Court was doing.
The second explanation for the Court's reallocation of the
burdens of proof is that the Court's view of the purposes of the
disparate impact theory has undergone a transformation. If the
disparate impact theory recognized by the Supreme Court is not
the pure form of the theory—if it is in fact a method by which to
challenge instances of pretextual intentional discrimination—then
the Court's allocation of the burdens of proof is not incorrect.
Under this "pretext" view of the disparate impact theory, the plain-
tiff's prima facie case showing that the challenged employment
practice has a disproportionate impact on members of minority
groups does not establish a violation of the statute, but only creates
an inference of discriminatory intent. That is, because the policy or
practice chosen by the employer has a discriminatory impact, an
inference is created that the employer intended the discriminatory
effect and chose the policy because of that effect.'"
265
 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Sc Trust, 487 U.S. 977,993-95 (1988); Wards Cove, 109
S. Ct. at 2124-25.
264
 This situation should be contrasted with the inference of intentional discrimination
created by the plaintiff's prima facie showing in a disparate treatment case, In Texas Depart-
meta of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court noted that the plaintiff's prima facie showing
that she applied and was rejected for an available position for which she was qualified created
an inference of intentional discrimination because it "eliminate[d1 the most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." 450 U.S. 248,253-54 (1981). This inference
of intentional discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case justifies shifting the
burden of production to the defendant to articulate a justification for its actions and allows
the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff if the defendant does not meet its burden of
production. Id, at 254.
215 See supra text following note 171.
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If this is the meaning of the plaintiff's prima facie case, when
the defendant rebuts that prima facie case by arguing that its prac-
tice or policy was based on legitimate business reasons, the defen-
dant is not raising an affirmative defense, but merely is seeking to
negate an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, namely, the
inference of intentional discrimination. When the defendant indi-
cates aiegitimate reason for its action, this reason rebuts the plain-
tiff's inference that the defendant adopted the policy for a discrim-
inatory reason by raising a genuine issue of fact about the
defendant's motivation. Because in this situation the defendant is
merely seeking to negate an element of the plaintiff's prima facie
case, the defendant should bear only a burden of production, not
a burden of persuasion, with respect to this issue. 26° The ultimate
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, who must meet
that burden by proving the existence of less discriminatory alter-
natives to the challenged employment practice. Under this view of
the theory, when the plaintiff establishes the existence of such al-
ternatives, this showing rebuts the defendant's claim that it adopted
the practice for a legitimate reason and suggests that the asserted
reason is "pretextuaL" Therefore, the plaintiff who makes this
showing has proven that the employment decision was really moti-
vated by discriminatory intent.
This second explanation of the Court's allocation of the bur-
dens of proof for disparate impact cases in Watson and Wards Cove
has much more support in the language used by the Court in those
cases. Both Watson and Wards Cove suggest that the Court believes
that the disparate impact theory is really about intentional discrim-
ination. In spite of the Court's surface denials, 267 there is a good
deal of evidence in those decisions that this second explanation
describes the Court's view of the disparate impact theory.
Although much of the language in the Court's decision in
Watson suggests that proof of intent is not necessary in a disparate
impact case, the Court appears to view the existence of intent as
2" See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
"7 The Court in Wards Cove described the disparate impact model as follows:
Griggs v. Duke Power Cu. construed Title VII to proscribe not only overt discrim-
ination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice.
Under this basis for liability, which is known as the disparate impact theory and
which is involved in this case, a facially neutral employment practice may be
deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective
intent to discriminate that is required in a disparate treatment case.
109 S. Ct. at 2118-19; see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87.
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relevant to the ultimate issue of liability. The Court repeatedly
stated that the plaintiff need not "prove" intentional discrimination
for a claim of disparate impact, but that this "do[es] not imply that
the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate
treatment analysis is used." 268 Because the ultimate issue in a dis-
parate treatment case is the existence of intentional discrimination,
this language suggests that the Court believes that intentional dis-
crimination also forms the basis of the disparate impact theory.
The Court's citation to the concurring opinion of Justice Ste-
vens in Washington v. Davis as support for its claim that the ultimate
legal issue is the same in both types of cases supports this interpre-
tation of the Court's language. The portion of the Washington v.
Davis opinion cited by the Watson Court provides:
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will
be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of
the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his deeds... .
My point in making this observation is to suggest that
the line between discriminatory purpose and discrimina-
tory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite
as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might
assume.269
This language, apparently cited with approval by the Watson Court,
suggests that evidence of impact may be relevant because it is evi-
dence of the existence of intent. The Court's reliance on this lan-
guage suggests that the Court is equating discriminatory impact and
discriminatory intent.
The Watson Court also seemed to subordinate the disparate
impact theory to the disparate treatment theory when it indicated
luB Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87. The Court's reference to the "ultimate legal issue" is
troublesome. The existence of intentional discrimination in a disparate treatment case is
normally considered to be a factual, not a legal, issue. The authority cited in support of this
statement, however, suggests that the existence of intent is sometimes a legal, and sometimes
a factual, issue. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
What the Court may have meant, when it said that the ultimate legal issue is the same
in both types of cases, is that both types of cases involve the ultimate legal issue of the
existence of a Title VII violation. This interpretation of the language turns the Court's
statement into a tautology and does not seem to be supported by the citation of authority
immediately following it, authority that is introduced with a "see, e.g." signal. See A UNIFORM
SYSTEM or CITATION § 2.2 (14th ed. 1986) ("see" signal means that "cited authority directly
supports the proposition").
269 426 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:1
that the practices made unlawful by the disparate impact theory are
prohibited because they are "functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination." 270
 This language suggests that disparate impact
analysis is justified, not because of its own merit, but because it
reaches the same results as does disparate treatment analysis."'
The Court's opinion in Wards Cove also contains language sug-
gesting that the disparate impact theory is a method of establishing
the existence of intentional discrimination. In describing the show-
ing that the employer must make to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie
case, the Court indicated that the determination of whether the
employer has met its burden centers on "a reasoned review of the
employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice," be-
cause "a mere insubstantial justification in this regard . .. would
permit discrimination to be practiced through use of spurious,
seemingly neutral employment practices." 272
 The Court seems to be
indicating that the actual necessity for a challenged practice is not
what warrants the imposition of a practice with a disproportionate
impact, but rather whether the "justification" given by the employer
is substantial enough to suggest that the employer had a nondiscri-
minatory reason or motive in adopting the practice.
The suggestion that intentional discrimination is an element of
a disparate impact challenge is even more pronounced in the
Court's discussion of the plaintiff's rebuttal burden:
[R]espondents will have to persuade the factfinder that
"other tests or selection devices without a similarly unde-
sirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legit-
imate [hiring] interest[s];" by so demonstrating, respon-
dents would prove that "[petitioners were] using [their]
tests merely as 'pretext' for discrimination." If respon-
dents, having established a prima facie case, come forward
2" Watson, 487 U.S. at 987.
2" Id. at 987-88. A similar suggestion occurs in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
another case decided last term, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: "While the prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in an impact case may
both be indicators of discrimination or its 'functional equivalent,' they are not, in and of
themselves, the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment setting." 109 S. Ct.
1775, 1803-04 (1989).
This language may suggest that the disparate impact model, like the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, is simply an "indicator" of the type of discrimination that Title VII is "really"
aimed at—intentional discrimination. Under this view, the disparate impact analysis would
simply be another method by which a plaintiff could raise an inference of intentional
discrimination.
272 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
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with alternatives to petitioners' hiring practices that re-
duce the racially-disparate impact of practices currently
being used, and petitioners refuse to adopt these alter-
natives, such a refusal would belie a claim by petitioners
that their incumbent practices are being employed for
nondiscriminatory reasons. 273
The Court here seems to be using "pretext" in the normal sense of
the word, that is, to mean a coverup for intentionally discriminatory
activity. The Court's language suggests that the only way the plain-
tiff can counter the defendant's evidence of a legitimate business
reason is by offering alternative devices to the employer that are
unjustifiably rejected. This rejection would show "pretext" because
it would refute the showing of the employer that the challenged
practice was adopted for a nondiscriminatory reason.
IV. FUTURE OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. The Court's Merging of the Disparate Impact Theory into the
Disparate Treatment Theory
The Supreme Court's recent allocation of the burdens of proof
for disparate impact claims in Watson and Wards Cove is more con-
sistent with the view of the theory as a method of challenging
pretextual discrimination than as a method for challenging the
discriminatory effects of employer practices adopted with no intent
to discriminate. if the pretext model is indeed the correct interpre-
tation of the disparate impact theory, then the evidentiary standards
imposed by the Court are entirely appropriate to the goals of that
theory of discrimination. Conversely, if the disparate impact theory
is in fact aimed at what the courts have previously indicated—the
effects, and not the intent, of employer practices—the Court's evi-
dentiary standards are entirely inappropriate and will frustrate the
goals of Title VII by allowing employers to continue unlawful prac-
tices simply because the Court has imposed an impossible standard
of proof.271
Support exists for both versions of the disparate impact theory.
The ambiguity in the legislative history of Title VII makes it difficult
to state conclusively that one or the other version of the theory is
the one intended by Congress. On one hand, Congress's original
U3 Id. at 2126—'27.
214 See id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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primary concern with intentional discrimination suggests that the
purpose of the disparate impact theory may be to challenge pretex-
tual intentional discrimination, which would be more difficult to
establish if the plaintiff had to prove directly the discriminatory
intent or motivation of the employer. If the theory is viewed in this
way, the disparate impact theory becomes another method of indi-
rectly establishing evidence of intent to discriminate by inference,
similar to the inference of discrimination created by the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case.275
On the other hand, Congress's concern with equal employment
opportunity supports the pure version of the disparate impact the-
ory, which is based on an equal opportunity notion of equality. The
existence of a method to challenge the effects of employment prac-
tices that deny equal opportunity is necessary to the purposes for
which Title VII was originally adopted. Additionally, when the
Supreme Court originally articulated the disparate impact theory
in Griggs, it did not seem to be concerned with intentional discrim-
ination but with the effects of even unintentional discrimination.
Congress in its consideration of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 also indicated its concerns with the effects of discrimi-
natory practices, whether intended or not. Additionally, Congress
has enacted legislation to overrule the Court's decision in Wards
Cove by returning the evidentiary standards of the disparate impact
theory to what they were before that decision. 276 Whether that
legislation ultimately will become law is unclear, but there is sub-
stantial support in Congress and elsewhere for the disparate impact
theory as articulated in Griggs. 277
275 See supra note 194 and accompanying text for elements of McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case. Justice O'Connor seemed to equate the disparate impact theory and the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case requirements in her concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. at 1803-04. See supra note 271.
276
 See Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 136 CONG. REC. 59966 (daily ed. July 18, 1990),
H.R. 4000, 136 CONG. REC. H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). For a detailed discussion of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, see infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
277
 A great deal of support For the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
was expressed during consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, both by members who
supported that legislation and by members who were in opposition. The Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, in its favorable report on the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
called Griggs Itjhe single most important Title VII decision, both for the development of
the law and its impact on the daily lives of American workers." S. REP. No. 315, 101 Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1990). Senator Hatch, who led the opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in
the Senate, also expressed support for the Court's decision in Griggs. See 136 CONC. REC.
59330 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). In fact, a primary source of
contention in both the House and the Senate was the appropriate manner in which to codify
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A troublesome aspect of viewing the disparate impact theory
as a method of challenging pretextual intentional discrimination is
that such an interpretation of the theory robs it of force as an
independent basis for liability under Title VII. If the disparate
impact theory is simply another method of establishing pretextual
discrimination, the theory would appear to serve no purpose. Given
that the allocation of the burdens of proof for disparate impact
claims is now identical to that for disparate treatment claims, it is
difficult to see how a plaintiff could ever establish a violation of
Title VII under the disparate impact theory when it could not do
so under the disparate treatment theory.278 This is particularly true
given the rigorous standards of proof imposed by the Court in
Wards Cove.279 Thus, if application of the two theories would always
result in the same conclusion, it makes little sense to have two
different theories.
If the disparate impact theory is merely a method for establish-
ing pretextual intentional discrimination inferentially rather than
directly, there is no reason that discrimination claims traditionally
brought under the disparate impact theory could not instead be
brought under the disparate treatment theory. Consider, for ex-
ample, a plaintiff's challenge to the employer's adoption of a high
school diploma requirement on the grounds that such a require-
ment disproportionately impacts on minority group members. 28°
The plaintiff's showing of disproportionate impact caused by that
requirement could simply be considered another method of estab-
lishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standard
under which plaintiffs create inferences of intentional discrimina-
tion based on actions taken by employers. The Court has already
recognized that the precise elements needed to establish such a
Griggs; no one directly indicated that Griggs should not be codified in Title VII. See, e.g., 136
Corm. Rec. S9322 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (bill will restore
prior law from Griggs case); 136 CONC. RE C. 59328 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (Kennedy substitute fails to codify Griggs).
"4 Indeed, the plurality indicated that this should not be the case: "Nor do we think it
is appropriate to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination on the basis of less
evidence than is required to prove intentional discrimination." Watson v. Fort Worth Rank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
• "9 The plurality in Watson recognized that the rigorousness of the evidentiary standards
that it was articulating, which were ultimately adopted by the majority in Wards Cove, would
have a detrimental effect on the ability of plaintiffs to maintain claims of disparate impact.
Id.
289 The similarity between the facts of this example and the facts of Griggs is not
accidental.
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prima facie case depend on the facts of the particular case. 28 ' There
would appear to be no barrier to simply recognizing facts showing
the disparate impact of an employment policy as an alternative
formulation of the McDonnell Douglas prima fade case.
Once a plaintiff established an inference of discrimination by
its prima facie case, the defendant would then be required to artic-
ulate a "legitimate business justification" for its practice in order to
rebut the inference of intentional discrimination. In this example,
the defendant could present evidence that it adopted the require-
ment of a high school diploma in order to improve the composition
of its workforce. If held to be sufficient, this justification would
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by indicating that the chal-
lenged practice was adopted because of the needs of the business,
not for the purpose of discriminating. 282
 This "legitimate business
justification" would simply be a type of "legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason," which is the standard required for the burden of
production imposed on defendants in disparate treatment cases. 288
Finally, once the defendant articulated the business justification
for the challenged practice, the plaintiff would be able to prevail if
it could establish that there was a less discriminatory alternative to
the practice adopted by the defendant. Using the same example
discussed above, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that
other practices available to the employer would as efficiently and
economically serve the employer's business interests. 284 The plaintiff
might seek to establish that the employer could instead rely on the
results of written employment tests to improve the quality of its
workforce, assuming that those tests did not have as disproportion-
ate an impact on minority groups. Alternatively, the plaintiff might
argue that the employer could simply rely on references from other
employers to ensure the quality of its workforce. If sufficient, this
rebuttal would allow the plaintiff to prevail because it would dem-
onstrate that the defendant's practice was not really necessary. This
showing would suggest that the employment practice was in fact
28L See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 & n.13 (1973).
282
 Under the new standards for "business necessity" articulated by the Court in Wards
Cove, such a justification would be sufficient even if not essential to the needs of the business,
as long as the requirement "significantly served" the legitimate employment goals of the
employer. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989). Although this is a much looser standard of job
relatedness than that applied by the Court in Griggs in judging a similar justification for a
high school diploma requirement, 1 do nut necessarily mean to imply that such a justification
would meet the employer's rebuttal burden under the new standards.
288
 See .supra note 195 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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chosen for a discriminatory reason, rather than the reason asserted
by the defendant; that is, that the justification asserted by the de-
fendant was pretextual. Viewed in this manner, the plaintiff's re-
buttal• burden of showing a less discriminatory alternative would be
identical to the plaintiff's rebuttal burden of showing pretext tra-
ditionally imposed in disparate treatment cases.
The disparate impact theory interpreted as a method of chal-
lenging pretextual intentional discrimination would continue to
serve even less purpose with respect to challenges to subjective
employment practices, which the Court in Watson indicated were
appropriately challenged under the disparate impact theory. 285 If
subjective employment practices have a disproportionate impact on
minority group members, it is presumably because of the existence
of discriminatory motivation, either conscious or unconscious, on
the part of the persons making those subjective determinations.
Both conscious intentional discrimination and unconscious reliance
on stereotypes and prejudices are challengeable under the disparate
treatment theory; the altered disparate impact theory provides no
special advantages for attacking such employer practices. 286
The recent Supreme Court decisions appear to have turned
the disparate impact theory into simply another method of attacking
pretextual intentional discrimination. Viewed in this manner, the
disparate impact theory is principally an evidentiary device for es-
tablishing indirectly or inferentially a disparate treatment claim.
The Supreme Court seems to be intent on blending the two theories
of employment discrimination under Title VII into a single unified
285 Watson v. Fort Worth hank 8c Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988).
288
 The suggestion of the Court in Watson that the disparate impact theory might be a
necessary device for challenging reliance on stereotypes, id. at. 990, is unpersuasive in light
of the Court's recognition in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), that an
employee could state a claim based on sex stereotyping under the disparate treatment theory.
Although the trial court in that case had found that the employer had "consciously giv[en]
credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping," id. at 1783,
the Court more broadly indicated, in the context of the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim,
that Title VII means that "gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions." Id. at 1785.
The Court went on to note that:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group, for "[du forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes."
Id. at 1791. Nowhere did the Court suggest that this reliance on stereotypes had to be
conscious in order to state a claim under the disparate treatment theory.
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theory of discrimination, a theory focusing on the motivation of the
employer in taking actions against employees and turning a blind
eye to the effects of employer practices.
B. The Continuing Need for the Disparate Impact . Theory
The Supreme Court's efforts to merge the disparate impact
theory into the disparate treatment theory and thereby create a
single theory of liability under Title VII aimed at the motivation
behind employer action may very well reflect the belief of the ma-
jority of the Court that disparate impact analysis is a concept whose
time has come and gone. Justice Blackmun suggested this possibility
in the closing lines of his dissent in the Wards Cove case: "Sadly, [the
decision of the majority] comes as no surprise. One wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or,
more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites—is a prob-
lem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was." 287
Indeed, a recurring theme of the recent disparate impact de-
cisions of the Supreme Court has been a concern that employers
will be found liable unjustifiably for "innocent" practices, rather
than a concern that the increasingly rigorous standards of proof
imposed on plaintiffs will allow defendants to escape liability for
discriminatory practices. 288 The present majority of the Supreme
Court may simply not believe that the type of discrimination that is
the target of the "pure" disparate impact theory continues to be a
sufficient problem to justify the continued existence of the theory.
The apparent beliefs of the majority of the Court notwithstand-
ing, a vital need for disparate impact analysis continues to exist in
Title VII jurisprudence. As long as minority group members con-
tinue to suffer the disadvantages imposed on them by centuries of
societal discrimination, the equal treatment notion of equality un-
derlying the disparate treatment theory of employment discrimi-
nation will continue to fall short of the promise of true equality for
minority group members. Courts will allow employment decisions
to be made on the basis of arbitrary employment criteria that are
unrelated or unnecessary to the requirements of the job for which
they are imposed. The promise of equality through precisely equal
treatment of all individuâls by the'imposition of uniform criteria is
an empty promise for those who cannot meet those criteria because
287 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
"8
 Watson, 487 U.S. at 992-93; Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2122-27.
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of past discrimination or biological characteristics. As then Chief
Justice Burger wrote for the unanimous Court in Griggs:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for
employment or promotion may not provide equality of
opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled oiler of milk
to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has
now required that the posture and condition of the job-
seeker be taken into account. It has—to resort again to
the fable—provided that the vessel in which the milk is
proffered be one all seekers can use. 289
The intent or absence of intent of the employer in imposing re-
quirements for employment, although obviously relevant, should
not be controlling; individuals should not be deprived of equal
opportunity by either the improper motive or the arbitrary actions
of employers, however well-intended.
This debate is far from just an academic one. Not all employer
practices that have adversely affected the employment opportunities
of minorities were the result of' discriminatory motive. Those prac-
tices would not be unlawful if the disparate treatment theory was
effectively the only avenue available to challenge employer prac-
tices. The absence of the disparate impact theory would have meant
that the employer in Griggs, who in 1965 imposed a requirement of
a high school diploma or passing scores on intelligence tests as a
condition for promotion, could have lawfully continued to exclude
disproportionately blacks from employment in skilled positions by
use of arbitrary and non-job-related criteria, because the courts
expressly held that the employer had no discriminatory intent. 29°
Similarly, the employer in Connecticut v. Teal, who in 1978 imposed
a requirement of a written test for promotion to supervisory posi-
tions, could have lawfully continued to disqualify disproportionate
numbers of blacks from advancement to such positions based on a
test that may have been unrelated to the positions' requirements,
because the evidence before the Court suggested no discriminatory
intent on the part of the employer. 29 '
The merger of the disparate impact theory into the disparate
treatment theory would effectively insulate from challenge a num-
ber of employer practices adopted without discriminatory intent but
that nevertheless impose real disadvantages on members of minority
groups. This result is justified only if the primary focus of Title VII
2"9 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
299 See id. at 427-28, 432,
291 457 U.S. 440, 443, 452 (1982).
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is to impose liability on employers because of their wrongful motive
and actions based on such motive. If, instead, the primary purpose
behind Title VII's prohibition of discrimination is to improve the
employment opportunities of minorities by prohibiting unjustified
employer practices that disadvantage mirtoritis, then discrimina-
tory motive should not be a requirement of liability. A study of the
legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress was concerned
with improving the economic condition of minorities, as well as with
addressing the moral problem of discrimination. 292 To the extent
that employer "fault" is required to justify liability under Title VII,
that fault can be found in the arbitrary employment actions of
employers as much as in the discriminatory motives of such em-
ployers.
C. The Disparate Impact Theory's Chances for Survival
The Court's decisions in Watson and Wards Cove pose a funda-
mental threat to the future of the disparate impact theory as an
independent theory of employment discrimination. The prospects
of the Court reversing itself with respect to the theory are dim. if
the disparate impact theory is to survive, it will be because of Con-
gress's intervention. Both the House and the Senate recently passed
legislation to overrule the Court's decision in Wards Cove in which
the Court altered the burdens of proof in disparate impact cases.
The legislation, however, was vetoed by President Bush, 293 Although
Congress was unsuccessful in overriding the veto, it is unlikely that
we have seen the last of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. In light of the
support that exists in Congress for overturning Wards Cove,294 sim-
ilar legislation is likely to be introduced next session. 295
292 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
29] See 136 CONC. REC. S16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (veto message). The Senate
failed to override the Presidential veto by one vote. 136 CONG. REc. 516,589 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1990) (veto sustained by vote of 66 to 34).
294 See 136 CoNc. REC. 59830 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
(suggesting that both sides agree on the shifting of the burden of proof on the issue of
business necessity to the employer); 136 CONG. REC. H6748 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Goodling) (Michel substitute for H. R. 4000 would reverse Wards Cove by placing
burden of proof on employer). Even the Bush administration apparently supports placing
the burden of persuasion with respect to "business necessity" on the employer, as provided
by the alternative bill sent to Congress on October 20, 1990, immediately before the Presi-
dential veto. 136 CONG. REC. 816,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (description of alternative
bill).
295 One opponent to the Civil Rights Act of 1990 suggested this possibility immediately
after the Senate passed the legislation. See 136 CONG. REC. 510025 (daily ed. July 18, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Murkowski) (expressing hope that the President will veto the bill so that
Congress can get serious next year about passing meaningful civil rights legislation).
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If enacted, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 296 would legislatively
overrule the Court's allocation of the burdens of proof in disparate
impact cases by amending Title VII to provide that plaintiffs would
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that the
defendant's employment practices, either singly or in combination,
disproportionately affect a protected group. The plaintiff would
have both the burden of producing evidence of such an impact and
the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact as to the exis-
tence of that impact. Once the plaintiff met that burden, the defen-
dant would then be required to both produce evidence and ulti-
mately persuade the trier of fact that the challenged practice or
practices were justified by its business needs. 297
296 S. 2104, 136 CONG. REC. S9966 (daily ed. July 18, 1990); H.R. 4000, 136 CONG. REC.
H6827 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would also legislatively overrule
the following Supreme Court decisions; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); Lorance v. AT & -r Technol-
ogies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Gt. 2180 (1989); Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
297 The Civil Rights Act of 1990, as passed by the Senate,•would overrule the Court's
decision in Wards Cave by adding the following language to § 703 of 'ritle VII:
(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES —
(I) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this section when —
(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment practice results in a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required by busi-
ness necessity; or
(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a dispat'ate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such group of employment
practices are required by business necessity, except that —
(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a complaining party demonstrates that a
group of employment practices results in a disparate impact, such party shall
not be required to demonstrate which specific practice or practices within the
group results in such disparate impact;
(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice within
such group of employment practices does not contribute to the disparate impact,
the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is re-
quired by business necessity; and
(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party can identify, from records or
other information of the respondent reasonably available (through discovery or
otherwise), which specific practice or practices contributed to the disparate
impact —
(1) the complaining party shall be required to demonstrate which specific prac-
tice or practices contributed to the disparate impact, and
(II) the respondent shall be required to demonstrate business necessity only as
to the specific practice or practices demonstrated by the complaining party to
have contributed to the disparate impact.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business ne-
cessity may be used as a defense only against a claim under this subsection.
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Enactment into law of the portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1990 addressing the Wards Cove decision would be a positive step
in reversing the damage done to the disparate impact theory by the
Supreme Court's recent decisions. Amending Title VII in this man-
ner for the first time would expressly codify the disparate impact
theory in the statute. There would no longer be any issue as to
whether Congress intended the disparate impact theory, in some
form, to have a place in Tide VII jurisprudence.
This amendment to Title VII would also provide some clues
as to Congress's choice between the different versions of the dis-
parate impact theory. Reallocating the burden of persuasion to the
defendant with respect to the defense of "business necessity" would
be consistent with the pure version of the disparate impact theory
and would strengthen the argument that business necessity should
properly be considered an affirmative defense to a claim of dispar-
ate impact. In fact, during the consideration of the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, some members of Congress who supported the bill ex-
pressly indicated their belief that business necessity should be con-
sidered to be an affirmative defense for which the defendant should
properly have the burden of persuasion. 298
Additionally, the reallocation of the burdens of production and
persuasion under the disparate impact theory would once again
create evidentiary differences between the disparate treatment the-
ory and the disparate impact theory. This reallocation would suggest
the existence of differences between the theories, both in process
and in purpose. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this change
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would also define the term "demonstrates" to mean "meets
the burdens of production and persuasion" and define the phrase "required by business
necessity" to mean that challenged selection practices "bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job" and that other practices "bear a significant relationship
to business objective of the employer." S. 2104, 136 CONG. REC. S9966-67 (daily ed. July 18,
1990).
2" See 136 CoNG. REC. 59351 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon)
(introducing testimony of former Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, who
indicated that business necessity is a defense to justify a disparate impact caused by an
employer practice, and the burden for such a justification defense is properly imposed on
the employer); 136 CONG. Rec. 59827 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Spector)
(employer should bear burden of proof on affirmative defense of business necessity of
challenged practice). Some opponents of the bill took the position that business necessity was
not an affirmative defense, but that lack of business necessity was an element of the plaintiff's
claim of discrimination. See 136 CoNG. REC. S9935-36 (daily ed. July '18, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) (disparate impact theory makes illegal neutral devices that cause a dispropor-
tionate impact and are not job-related; "the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove
the existence of each of these elements of wrongdoing").
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would make it more likely that plaintiffs could actually prove liability
and recover under the disparate impact theory, thereby reestablish-
ing some of the theory's independent validity.
It is unclear, however, that even the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 would save the disparate impact theory. The
focus of Congress in its consideration of this legislation so far has
been on the difficulties of proof imposed on plaintiffs seeking to
prove disparate impact29" and on defendants seeking to defend
themselves against disparate impact claims. 30° Although the place-
ment of those burdens is of course important in and of itself, the
Supreme Court's allocation of the burdens is also important because
of the information that it provides regarding the Court's percep-
tions of the purpose of the disparate impact theory. The legislative
reallocation of those burdens will not necessarily alter the Court's
perception and therefore its application of the disparate impact
theory. The Court had signaled that it viewed the disparate impact
theory as a method of challenging pretextual intentional discrimi-
nation long before the Court's reallocation of the burdens of proof
in Watson and Wards Cove."
In order for the Civil Rights Act of 1990 to preserve the dis-
parate impact theory, Congress must recognize that the Watson and
Wards Cove cases have called into question the essence of the dis-
parate impact theory, not only its enforcement. Congress must clar-
ify to the Court its understanding of the disparate impact theory.
Congress must specifically address its understanding of the theory
as a method to challenge the effects of employer action without
regard to the intent or motive behind those actions.
There are indications that Congress may do exactly that. In his
remarks supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1990, Senator Simon
2'" See S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1990); 136 CONG, REC. S9321
(daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (Wards Cove makes it "far more difficult
and expensive for victims of discrimination to challenge the barriers they face"); 136 CONG.
REC. 59914 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (shift of burden of proof to
plaintiff' has "made a difficult task an almost impossible one for the working men and women
of this country who are the plaintiffs in these cases"); 136 CONG. REC. 59943 (daily ed. July
18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Spector) (stressing difficulties of proof imposed on plaintiffs
with meritorious disparate impact eases); 136 CONG. REC. 116778 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Hawkins) (unreasonable to impose burden on employees to disprove
business justification because within special knowledge of employer).
"" See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 59339-40 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (bill would force employers to resort to quotas to avoid litigation because of
difficulties of proof).
"I See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text,
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indicated that "Wit is now up to Congress to correct the mistakes
made by the Court last year and to signal our clear intent that
discrimination against women and minorities—no matter how un-
intentional or subtle—has no place in the workplace or in our
society."302
Other members of Congress, both those supporting and those
opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, expressed their belief that
the disparate impact theory reached instances of unintentional dis-
crimination.303 Other portions of the legislative history, however,
contain disturbing suggestions, even by supporters of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, that the purpose of the disparate impact theory
is to allow a plaintiff to indirectly prove intent to discrminate that
would be difficult to prove directly:" and that disparate impact is
relevant because it creates an "inference ... that there has not been
fairness for a minority." 3°5 Although these comments might be dis-
missed as simply the views of a few members of Congress, their
presence in the legislative history provides some ambiguity as to
Congress's views of the essence of the disparate impact theory.
The future of the disparate impact theory is in the hands of
Congress. It must make clear its view of the basis and purposes of
the disparate impact theory. Only if Congress does so, and only if
the Supreme Court heeds the directive of Congress, will the future
of the disparate impact theory be secured.
502 135 CONG. REC. S1024 (Feb. 7, 1990).
"' See S. REP. No. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1990): S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1990) (minority views of Sens. Hatch, Thurmond, and Coats); 136 CONG. REG.
S9606 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of,Sen. Dodd) (disparate impact theory does not
require that business practice be based on discriminatory intent); 136 CONG. REC. H6776
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (recognizing holding of Griggs that
practices do not have to be motivated by discriminatory intent to be unlawful).
" See 136 CONG. REC. 59828 ( July 17, 1990) (statement by Sen. Spector) ("If intent can
be proved, there is no doubt about the claim being established. But intent in the law is a
very difficult thing to prove. That is why the courts and the Supreme Court in the Griggs
case established what is called 'disparate impact.'").
"5 See 136 CONG. REC. S9941 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Spector).
